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ENERGY INDEPENDENCE AND CLIMATE CHANGE:
THE ECONOMIC AND NATIONAL SECURITY
CONSEQUENCES OF FAILING TO ACT
Mark E. Rosen *
I. INTRODUCTION
In 2007, the Center for Naval Analyses Military Advisory
Board ("CNA MAB")1 issued a report, National Security and the
Threat of Climate Change, which was signed by eleven retired
three- and four-star flag and general officers. 2 That report ana-
lyzed current scientific evidence on the subject of climate change
and concluded that, among other things, the "nature and pace of
climate changes being observed today and the consequences pro-
jected by the consensus scientific opinion are grave and pose
equally grave implications for our national security."3 Unchecked,
climate change is a "threat multiplier for instability in some of
the most volatile regions in the world," and immediate action
* Deputy General Counsel, CNA Corporation. LL.M., 1991, University of Virginia
School of Law; J.D., 1978, University of Georgia School of Law; A.B., 1974, University of
Georgia. Mr. Rosen has over thirty years of experience in the legal and national security
fields, including positions with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and a twenty-
one year career as an international and maritime lawyer with United States Navy. Mr.
Rosen holds adjunct teaching appointments at George Washington University School of
Law and Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University. He teaches courses in Home-
land Security Law and Policy.
1. The CNA Corporation ("CNA") is a 501(c)(3) nonprofit corporation headquartered
in Alexandria, Virginia. CNA Corp., About Us, http://www.cna.orglabout (last visited Feb.
23, 2010). CNA is best known for operating the Center for Naval Analyses, a federally
funded research and development center serving the U.S. Department of the Navy. CNA
Corp., Center for Naval Analyses, http://www.cna.org/aboutlcna (last visited Feb. 23,
2010). CNA provides analytic support to many other sponsors, including the U.S. Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services and the U.S. Department of Education. See CNA
Corp., Contract Vehicles, http://www.cna.org/about/workingwith/vehicles.aspx (last visited
Feb. 23, 2010).
2. CNA CORP., NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE THREAT OF CLIMATE CHANGE 1 (2007),
available at http://www.cna.org/nationalsecurity/climate/report/SecurityandClimate Final.
pdf.
3. Id.
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should be taken to both assess the impacts on climate change and
to mitigate those changes. 4
A companion CNA MAB report, Powering America's Defense,
discusses the extensive resources and human capital the United
States commits to preserve its access to energy resources, espe-
cially oil from the Persian Gulf region.5 Today, the stakes are
much higher for U.S. national security because the percentage of
foreign oil that is being imported has increased greatly since
President Carter made his famous declaration of war in favor of
energy independence in 1980.6 According to the CNA's findings,
U.S. military presence in the Persian Gulf is necessary to ensure
the unimpeded flow of oil because "America's thirst for oil leaves
little choice."7 Even in theaters of combat operations such as Afg-
hanistan and Iraq, the "fuel intensity" of today's combat missions
means that commanders must divert a disproportionate number
of combat troops and assets towards protecting fuel supplies and
convoys. 8 Consequently, there are fewer troops available to en-
gage the enemy.9
This article draws heavily from the works of the CNA MAB,
namely the twin and interrelated challenges arising from impru-
dent reliance on fossil fuels by developed and developing coun-
tries, as well as the serious environmental and national security
"externalities" that directly result from current consumptive
trends.10
4. Id.
5. See CNA CORP., POWERING AMERICA'S DEFENSE: ENERGY AND THE RISKS TO
NATIONAL SECURITY 7 (2009), available at http://www.cna.org/documents/PoweringAmeri
casDefense.pdf.
6. Id. at 6-7.
7. Id. at 7.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. See id. at vii, 41. Venerable scholars like Dr. Thomas Homer-Dixon and the Army
War College's Dr. Kent Butts have been writing for some time that there are serious na-
tional security implications from resource depletion, environmental degradation, and cli-
mate change. See STRATEGIC STUDIES INST., ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY: A DOD PARTNER-
SHIP FOR PEACE v (Kent Hughes Butts ed., 1994), available at http://www.strategicstudies
institute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=339; Thomas Homer-Dixon, Research, http:/!
www.homerdixon.com/research.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2010). However, CNA's work is
unique in that it was the first time that a large number of senior "warfighters" collectively
characterized environmental and hydrocarbon consumptive patterns as significant threats
to the United States and global security. See CNA CORP., supra note 2, at 1 (discussing the
findings of eleven retired "warfighters" with respect to climate change and concomitant
threats to national security). CNA's work is also significant in its call for specific nonmili-
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In assessing the road ahead in terms of legislation and policy,
this article incorporates the analysis of two Pulitzer Prize win-
ning authors, Thomas L. Friedman and Jared Diamond, both of
whom spent a considerable portion of their professional careers
trying to understand the root causes of conflict and societal col-
lapse and, especially in the case of Friedman, offer a roadmap for
the future." Using historical case studies, Diamond assesses fac-
tors that contribute to societal collapse as well as those which en-
able societies under stress to survive. 12 These historical examples
are instructive in identifying policy and legal approaches to com-
bat excessive global reliance on fossil fuel and the susceptibility of
states, especially in the developing world, to collapse due to cli-
mate change and, in some respects, their continued reliance upon
carbon-based fuel sources.
Part II first looks at Diamond's anatomy of collapse and dis-
cusses the factors that lead to collapse for developed and develop-
ing countries. In particular, it explores how the current U.S. de-
pendence on oil and other greenhouse gas ("GHG") producing
fuels, such as coal, creates risks associated with resource scarcity
as well as those associated with their use-namely, climate
change and environmental degradation.
Part III examines the impact of climate change on internation-
al security and why the current trends are unfavorable because of
the large number of states currently at risk of collapse. 3
Applying Diamond's collapse risk model, Part IV assesses the
risks to the United States, then reviews some of the measures be-
ing taken by the United States to reduce vulnerabilities, domesti-
cally and internationally. Drawing on the thesis of Thomas L.
Friedman, Part V asserts that the current crisis in climate
change and energy dependence on carbon-intensive fuels presents
tary actions to be taken at a national and global level. See id. at 46-48.
11. See generally JARED DIAMOND, COLLAPSE: How SOCIETIES CHOOSE TO FAIL OR
SUCCEED (2005); THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, HOT, FLAT, & CROWDED: WHY WE NEED A GREEN
REVOLUTION-AND How IT CAN RENEW AMERICA (2008).
12. See DIAMOND, supra note 11, at 11.
13. While this article does not examine the scientific nexus between human activity
and climate change, it is inescapable that climate change is real and is a danger to both
the developed and the developing world. See generally Union of Concerned Scientists,
Scientific Consensus on Global Warming, http://www.ucsusa.orgssi/climate-changescien
tific-consensus-on.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2010) (summarizing the consensus opinion of
several scientific societies on climate change).
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a unique opportunity.14 Friedman argues that the United States
should be at the forefront of a "green revolution" because it
presents a significant commercial and economic opportunity for
the United States to emerge out of its current economic doldrums
and effect transformative retraining and retooling in order to
move from a carbon economy to one relying upon clean, renewable
energy sources." "[T]he best way for America to solve its big prob-
lem-the best way for America to get its 'groove back'-is for us to
take the lead in solving the world's big problem."6
In the concluding section, this article assesses how best to ac-
complish this goal given the proposals currently on the table and
the time remaining before the United States experiences signifi-
cant negative consequences.
II. THE ANATOMY OF COLLAPSE: THE CAUSES AND
CONSEQUENCES
The seminal anthropological study by Jared Diamond provides
historical support for the proposition that natural resource scarci-
ty can lead to conflict that threatens U.S. security. 7 Diamond
identified five contributing factors-environmental damage, cli-
mate change, hostile neighbors, friendly trade partners, and a so-
ciety's response to environmental problems-that led to conflict
among adjoining states and, ultimately, the risk of implosion
leading to extinction. 8 Diamond asserts that
[W]e shouldn't be so naive to think that study of the past will yield
simple solutions, directly transferable to our societies today. We dif-
fer from past societies in some respects that put us at lower risk
than them; some of those respects often mentioned include our po-
werful technology (i.e., its beneficial effects), globalization, modern
medicine, [etc.] .... We also differ from past societies in some re-
spects that put us at greater risk than them: mentioned in that con-
nection are, again, our potent technology (i.e., its unintended de-
structive effects), globalization (such that now a collapse even in
remote Somalia affects the U.S. and Europe), the dependence of mil-
lions (and, soon, billions) of us on modern medicine for our survival,
14. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 11, at 172.
15. See id.
16. Id. at 5.
17. See DIAMOND, supra note 11, at 498.
18. Id. at 11.
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and our much larger human population. Perhaps we can still learn
from the past, but only if we think carefully about its lessons. 9
Diamond's anthropological study of the extinction of civiliza-
tion on Easter Island in the South Pacific is a useful case study of
the linkages between cultural decline and unsustainable use of
carbon-based energy sources. Easter Island was blessed with a
temperate climate and fertile soil as a result of volcanic activity. 21
However, the island's temperate-as opposed to tropical-climate
and its geographic isolation meant that Easter Island was not en-
dowed with as many fish species or freshwater supplies as some
of its tropical counterparts.' Carbon dating of remains discloses
that Easter Island was settled sometime around 900 A.D. and
thrived until roughly 1700 A.D. 22 At one point, Easter Island had
extensive agricultural activity, sophisticated systems for raising
chicken and other livestock, incredible skill in stone maso-
nry/engineering, and technology to construct large outriggers that
could travel thousands of miles through the open ocean to engage
in trade.2 3 By the 1700s, however, the island's populations of
plants, wildlife, and people were in steep decline. 24
Diamond notes that during the good years, much of the island
became increasingly deforested as the islanders consumed palms
and hardwoods for various uses, including the manufacture of
charcoal for heating and cooking. 25 By the 1400s almost all trees
had disappeared.26 Once the trees disappeared, the islanders were
no longer able to construct boats for trade.27 Wild sources of food
were lost because there were no forests to sustain wildlife, and
the population exploited fish stocks to extinction. 2 Agriculture al-
so collapsed: the loss of forests led to top soil erosion and nutrient
loss as crops were defenseless against wind and rain.2 9 Starvation
became the order of the day, leading to civil war, population
crash, and cannibalism2 0 Captain Cook visited the island in 1774
19. Id. at 8.
20. Id. at 83.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 90, 109.
23. See id. at 91-93, 99-101, 104-06.
24. Id. at 109.
25. See id. at 106-07.
26. Id. at 107.
27. See id. at 107-08.
28. Id. at 108.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 109.
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and observed that the islanders were "small, lean, timid, and mi-
serable."3' The number of home sites in the coastal region "de-
clined by 70% from peak values around 1400-1600 to the
1700s .... ,,31 By 1872, only 111 islanders were left on Easter,
compared with a minimum population of 6000 to 8000 before the
crash began.3
The sad tale of Easter Island vividly documents the externali-
ties associated with unsustainable exploitation of natural re-
sources and, in particular, the dilemma facing developing coun-
tries of sacrificing forests and habitats in order to heat and feed
their populations. In his discussion of Easter Island, Diamond ar-
gues that its collapse would be less likely to occur today because
of increased "globalization, international trade, jet planes, and
the Internet ... [A]ll countries on Earth today share resources
and affect each other, just as did Easter's dozen clans .... When
Easter Islanders got into difficulties, there was nowhere to which
they could flee, nor to which they could turn for help .... ,,3' But
because of the Malthusian effect on world population numbers,
the developed and developing worlds are neither anxious nor will-
ing-to the point of committing genocide as in modern Rwanda-
to absorb populations that are displaced because of environmen-
tal collapse. 35 Regarding fuel consumption, even if a struggling
nation were to substitute oil for charcoal as a subsistence fuel, it
would not create a sustainable outcome. Developing countries
frequently do not have the financial resources to purchase oil for
transportation, heating, and agricultural processes; conversely,
they unsustainably exploit their natural resources to pay for the
fuel, which they need to survive.3 1
The tale of Easter Island has been repeated in modern history,
with violent outcomes. The genocide that occurred in Rwanda in
1992 is often attributed to ethnic violence and power competi-
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 91, 112.
34. Id. at 119.
35. See id. at 313. The Malthusian effect is a theory advanced by English economist
Thomas Malthus. Id. at 312. The basic premise of the theory is that population growth
surpasses the growth of food production, and all available food supplies will be consumed
unless population growth is restrained by famine, war, disease, or authorities making pre-
ventative choices. Id.
36. Richard G. Lugar, Poorer by the Gallon; Oil Dependency, INT'L HERALD TRIB., June
9, 2006, at 7.
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tion.3 7 Population growth, however, contributed to the escalation
of violence leading up to the genocide as well.38 Immediately be-
fore the violence in the mid-1990s, Rwanda's population density
was 760 per square mile, a number much greater than the 610
per square mile population density in the United Kingdom at that
time.3 9 Because of Rwanda's population density, forests in the
hillsides and lowlands were clear-cut for fuel and farming, and
virtually every arable scrap of land was cultivated. 40 Poor farming
practices led to widespread erosion, the drying up of streams, and
irregular rainfalls. 41 As a result of the collapse of agriculture and
conflicts over land ownership, widespread conflict erupted in 1994
with heavy losses of life. 42 Rwanda is not an isolated case study in
the collapse of a modern state. According to Foreign Policy, there
are currently fourteen states around the world that are in a "crit-
ical" state of collapse, including Haiti, Somalia, Zimbabwe, Afg-
hanistan, Pakistan, Kenya, and Iraq.43 In addition, forty-five
states are rated "in danger" of near-term collapse."
There are bright spots in history. The people of the Dominican
Republic, until recently, enjoyed relative prosperity in relation to
its neighbor Haiti, both of which share the island of Hispaniola. 45
This can be attributed to prior efforts by the Dominican Republic
leaders to establish a very large national park system and their
use of the armed forces to prevent illegal logging and farming. 46 In
the 1600s, Japan experienced a brief episode of deforestation for
buildings, heating, and cooking. 47 In 1657, however, following a
serious forest fire, a succession of shoguns "invoked Confucian
37. DIAMOND, supra note 11, at 317.
38. Id. at 318-20.
39. Id. at 319.
40. Id. at 319-20.
41. Id. at 320.
42. Id. at 322-24. Over 800,000 people were killed as a result of the violence out-
breaks in Rwanda. Id. at 317.
43. See The Failed States Index 2009, FOREIGN POL'Y, July-Aug. 2009, at 82-83,
available at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/06/22/the_2009_failed-statesin
dex. Oil-rich Nigeria ranks fifteenth on the 2009 list of "Failed States" classified as "in
danger" of collapse. Id. at 83.
44. Id. at 83.
45. See DIAMOND, supra note 11, at 329.
46. Id. at 332, 343. The situation in the Dominican Republic is less optimistic today
with the reappearance of some pockets of illegal logging and the presence of a large num-
ber of illegal Haitian migrants (constituting 12% of the population in 2005) who have de-
structively farmed the border regions. Id. at 349-50, 355.
47. Id. at 297.
20101
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
principles... that encouraged limiting consumption and accumu-
lating reserve supplies" as a national ideology.48 The end result
today is that Japan has the "highest population density of any
large First World country .... [D]espite that high population,
almost 80% of Japan's area consists of sparsely populated fo-
rested mountains ... while most people and agriculture are
crammed into the plains that make up only one-fifth of the coun-
try."49 Finally, the tiny but densely populated island of Tikopia in
the south Pacific has 800 people per square mile but has been
sustainably occupied for over 3000 years. 50 The island is covered
with multi-storied rainforests in which the highest level-the ca-
nopy-provides shelter for agricultural activity in the understo-
ry.51 Throughout history, the inhabitants have practiced birth
control, including less humanitarian forms of population control,
and they have used a permit system in which a chief must ap-
prove the harvesting of fish or shellfish from the local waters or
the hunting of animals.52
A. Consequences
The most traditional consequence of state failure is that despe-
rate poverty fuels mass migration to adjoining states and devel-
oped countries.13 However, social science literature suggests that
states in transition, i.e., failing states, are much more susceptible
to internal conflicts, terrorism, the emergence of aggressive dicta-
tors, or other circumstances-which may require a military re-
sponse of one sort or another by developed counties.
Regimes in transition seem to be the most prone to internal
conflicts and terrorism.- Matthew Krain postulated in 2005 that
"state failure" was causative of genocides or politicides. 5 This
same body of research suggests that more democratic nations
48. Id. at 299.
49. Id. at 294.
50. Id. at 286.
51. Id. at 288.
52. Id. at 289-90.
53. Id. at 516.
54. See Alberto Abadie, Poverty, Political Freedom, and the Roots of Terrorism, 96 AM.
ECON. REV. 50, 51 (2006).
55. Matthew Krain, International Intervention and the Severity of Genocides and Poli-
ticides, 49 INT'L STUD. Q., 363, 372 (2005).
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have less terrorism and are less likely to experience genocide or
politicide.16 Krain explained the phenomena as follows:
State failures promote domestic instability, and open windows of op-
portunity during which murderous policies become more likely. In
most cases, internal wars are the first in a complex series of events,
often including other destabilizing events such as war, decoloniza-
tion, or extra-constitutional changes in leadership. Evidence sug-
gests that the greater the number of state failures experienced, the
more severe the instance of state-sponsored mass murder.5"
In 1795, Immanuel Kant wrote the essay Perpetual Peace, in
which he postulated that constitutional republics are a necessary
condition for world peace. 5s Kant's theory was that a majority of
the people would never vote to go to war, unless in self defense;
therefore, if all nations were republics, it would end war because
there would be no aggressors. 9 Kant's theory on state behavior
has been proven correct in the post-World War II period in which
state behavior is governed by the use-of-force principles set forth
in the United Nations ("UN") Charter.60 With few exceptions, in
the post-UN Charter era, totalitarian regimes are more willing to
resort to force while democracies tend to be reluctant to use force,
sometimes to the point of isolationism.61 It logically follows then
that preventing the collapse-or near collapse-of states is
desirable to both mitigate the effects of the displacement of
56. See Abadie, supra note 54, at 51.
57. Krain, supra note 55, at 372 (internal citations omitted).
58. IMMANUEL KANT, Toward Perpetual Peace, in TOWARD PERPETUAL PEACE AND
OTHER WRITINGS ON POLITICS, PEACE, AND HISTORY 74-75, 78 (Pauline Kleingeld ed.,
2006).
59. Id. at 74-76.
60. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4. The UN Charter Framework requires that states re-
solve their disputes peacefully, respect the political and territorial integrity of other
states, and refrain from any use of armed force. Id. The primary exception is the exercise
of self defense against an armed attack. Id. art. 51. Multiple rationales can be advanced to
support Kant's theory, namely:
democratic leaders are restrained by the resistance of their people to bearing
the costs and deaths of war; the diversity of institutions and relations within
and between democracies creates checks and balances and cross-pressures
inhibiting belligerence among them; a democratic [capitalist] culture of nego-
tiation and conciliation means that in their interaction with other democra-
cies, democratic leaders are basically dovish; [and] democracies see each oth-
er of the same kind, sharing the same values, and thus are more willing to
negotiate than fight.
R.J. Rummel, Democracies Don't Fight Democracies, PEACE MAG., May-June 1999, at 10,
12.
61. See JOHN NORTON MOORE & ROBERT F. TURNER, NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 81 (2d
ed. 2005).
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affected individuals and prevent the emergence of regimes that
could act aggressively towards the United States, its allies, or its
neighbors .62
Many of the lessons in Collapse are relevant to the questions
raised by climate change and lack of energy independence, par-
ticularly as they relate to countries that are transitional or those
that are at high risk of collapse. Diamond makes the especially
important point, worth repeating from above, that the collapse of
any state today has the potential to put distant states at risk be-
cause
[T]he types of environmental dangers.., today [are different
from] ... those faced by past societies. A major difference has to do
with globalization, which lies at the heart of the strongest reasons
both for pessimism and for optimism about our ability to solve our
current environmental problems. Globalization makes it impossible
for modem societies to collapse in isolation, as did Easter Island and
the Greenland Norse in the past. Any society in turmoil today, no
matter how remote-think of Somalia and Afghanistan as exam-
ples-can cause trouble for prosperous societies on other continents,
and is also subject to their influence (whether helpful or destabiliz-
ing).63
B. Factors Leading to Stress or State Collapse
Diamond's research identified five factors that lead to collapse:
(1) environmental damage rendering human habitat to be unfit,
(2) climate change, (3) hostile neighbors, (4) decreased support by
friendly neighbors, and (5) the ability of a given society to take
measures to confront one of the other challenges and prevent col-
lapse."
For policymakers in both the developed and the developing
world, this five-point framework enables the assessment of any
society's vulnerability to collapse, including the impacts of global
climate change on the vulnerability of developed states like the
United States. Examination of these issues will continue from the
perspective of the loss of energy independence-a problem for de-
62. See DIAMOND, supra note 11, at 515-16.
63. Id. at 23.
64. Id. at 11-15. Japan and China are examples of countries which have been able to
readily adapt to challenges because of their relatively homogenous populations and com-
parative high levels of intelligence which enabled responsible leadership to emerge. Cf. id.
at 305-06, 373-74.
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veloping countries especially-and the impacts of climate change.
Even though both perspectives will be dealt with separately, it
will hopefully become readily apparent that the two issues are in-
terrelated and cannot be analytically separated.
III. OIL, GLOBAL PEACE, AND STABILITY
President Roosevelt's tacit agreement in 1945 with Saudi Ara-
bia promising U.S. protection in return for special U.S. access to
Saudi oil has more or less put the United States in the middle of
four regional conflicts: Israel vs. Arab nations, Iraq vs. Iran, Iraq
vs. Kuwait, and the United States vs. Iraq.65 The links between
access to oil and national security became explicit during the
Carter administration, in which the United States signaled its
willingness to use military force to protect the world's access to oil
in order to protect the global market.66 During that period, some
international lawyers apparently reasoned that access to oil-
essential for the generation of energy and food-is a fundamental
human right, which might reasonably justify the use of armed
force to protect commercial access.67 Indeed, shortly after the
65. See Sarah Ebe, U.S. Foreign Oil Dependence: Issue Brief (unpublished manu-
script), available at http://www.writing.ucsb.edu/faculty/dean/50/2008papers/ebe.pdf; see
also PBS Frontine, Saudi Arabia: A Chronology of the Country's History and Key Events
in the U.S.-Saudi Relationship, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/saudi/etc/
cron.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2010).
66. CNA CORP., supra note 5, at 6-7. The so-called "Carter Doctrine" was a policy
proclaimed by former President Jimmy Carter in his State of the Union Address on Janu-
ary 23, 1980. Id. In that speech, Carter declared that the United States would use military
force, if necessary, to defend its national interests in the Persian Gulf region as related to
the access of hydrocarbon resources. Id. The doctrine was a response to the threats posed
to the United States by the 1979 invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union:
The region which is now threatened by Soviet troops in Afghanistan is of
great strategic importance: It contains more than two-thirds of the world's
exportable oil. The Soviet effort to dominate Afghanistan has brought Soviet
military forces to within 300 miles of the Indian Ocean and close to the
Straits of Hormuz, a waterway through which most of the world's oil must
flow. The Soviet Union is now attempting to consolidate a strategic position,
therefore, that poses a grave threat to the free movement of Middle East oil.
Jimmy Carter, President, State of the Union Address (Jan. 23, 1980), available at http://
jimmycarterlibrary.orgdocuments/speeches/su80jec.phtml.
67. The difficulty with this argument is that the use of armed force under the UN
Charter, Article 51, is only justified in self-defense of armed attack. U.N. Charter art. 51.
However, some international lawyers suggested that deprivation of oil may constitute a
form of coercion that is prohibited as a form of state behavior under Article 2(4) of the UN
Charter. See Jordan J. Paust & Albert P. Blaustein, The Arab Oil Weapon-A Threat to
International Peace, 68 AM. J. INT'L L. 410, 413, 415-17 (1974). Oil can also be linked to
Articles 25 and 28 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which ensures all
20101
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Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, President Bush imposed a de
facto military blockade of Iraq in advance of an authorization by
the UN Security Council for states to take military action to re-
move Iraqi forces from Kuwait.68 This action was the first time
since the Vietnam War that the United States had used military
force to protect an economic interest.6 9 The action prompted criti-
cisms from many-including the UN Secretary General-that the
United States must work through the Security Council. 0 Given
that blockades are generally considered equivalent to the aggres-
sive use of armed force under a traditional law-of-war analysis,' 1
the 1990 blockade vignette clearly demonstrates that the United
States-and presumably other states as well-regard access to oil
as a fundamental right, which may legally justify the use of mili-
tary force.
There is a growing consensus in U.S. national security circles
that American dependence on imported oil constitutes a threat to
the United States because a substantial portion of those oil re-
serves are controlled by governments that have historically pur-
sued policies inimical to U.S. interests. For example, Venezuela,
which represents eleven percent of U.S. oil imports, "regularly
espouses anti-American and anti-Western rhetoric both at home
and abroad... [and] ... promotes... [an] anti-U.S. influence in
parts of Latin and South America..."7 2 that retards the growth of
friendly political and economic ties among the United States, Ve-
nezuela, and a few other states in Latin and South America. This
scenario plays out in many different regions. Russia, for example,
has used its oil leverage to exert extreme political pressure upon
Ukraine and Belarus. 73 Longstanding Western commercial rela-
tions with repressive regimes in the Middle East-i.e., Iran, Su-
dan, and Saudi Arabia-raise similar issues because of the mixed
strategic messages that are being sent. Of course, large wealth
persons the rights of food and medical care. See id. at 436-37.
68. Michael R. Gordon, Bush Orders Navy to Halt All Shipments of Iraq's Oil and Al-
most All Its Imports, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 1990, at Al; see also S.C. Res. 678, U.N. DOc.
S/RES/678 (Nov. 29, 1990) (approving the use of force by member states).
69. Cf. id.
70. R.W. Apple, Jr., Ships Turn Away from Ports as Iraq Embargo Tightens; U.S. Mil-
itary Force Pours In, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 1990, at Al (UN Secretary General Perezde Cu-
ellar stating that only the UN has authority to decide about blockades).
71. MOORE & TURNER, supra note 61, at 735.
72. CNA CORP. supra note 5, at 3.
73. See id. at 3-4.
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transfers have allowed the Taliban in Saudi Arabia to bankroll
terrorism.14
A. Chokepoints and Flashpoints
For the foreseeable future, the U.S. military will most likely be
involved in protecting access to oil supplies-including the politi-
cal independence of oil producers-and the global movements of
using oil to help sustain the smooth functioning of the world
economy. The security challenges associated with preserving
access to oil are complicated by geographical "chokepoints,"
through which oil flows or is transported, but which are vulnera-
ble to piracy or closure.7 "Flashpoints" also exist as a result of po-
litical-and sometimes military-competition to secure commer-
cial or sovereign access to oil in the face of disputed maritime and
land claims that are associated with oil and gas deposits. Togeth-
er, these challenges have necessitated that the United States and
its allies maintain costly navies and air forces to protect sea
lanes, ocean access, and maintain a presence to deter military
competition in disputed regions. A selection of today's chokepoints
and flashpoints follow.
The Strait of Hormuz. This strait is the narrow waterway that
allows access from the Indian Ocean into the Persian Gulf. Two-
thirds of the world's oil is transported by ocean, and a very large
percentage of that trade moves through Hormuz. The northern
tip of Oman forms the southern shoreline of the strait.76 Hormuz
is protected by the constant transits of the U.S. Navy and its
allies. Even though the strait has not been closed, the Persian
Gulf has been the scene of extensive military conflict.17 On Sep-
tember 22, 1980, Iraq invaded Iran, initiating an eight-year war
between the two countries that featured the "War of the Tank-
ers," in which 543 ships, including the USS Stark, were attacked,
while the U.S. Navy provided escort services to protect tankers
74. See, e.g., NAT'L COMM. ON TERRORIST A"rAcKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11 COM-
MISSION REPORT 169-73 (2004) [hereinafter 9/11 COMMISSION].
75. Energy Info. Admin., World Oil Transit Chokepoints (Jan. 2008), http://www.eia.
doe.gov/cabs/World OilTransit.Chokepoints/Full.html.
76. Id.
77. Energy Info. Admin., Persian Gulf Oil and Gas Exports Fact Sheet (Mar. 2002),
http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/pgulf2.html.
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that were transiting the Persian Gulf.78 There have been past
threats by Iran to militarily close the strait.79 Additionally, there
are ongoing territorial disputes between the United Arab Emi-
rates and Iran over ownership of three islands that are located in
approaches to the strait. 0 Closure of the strait would cause severe
disruption in the movements of the world's oil supplies and, at a
minimum, cause significant price increases and perhaps supply
shortages in many regions for the duration of the closure .8 Dur-
ing the War of the Tankers, oil prices increased from $13 per bar-
rel to $31 a barrel due to supply disruptions and other "fear" fac-
tors .2
Bab el-Mandeb. The strait separates Africa (Djibouti and Eri-
trea) and Asia (Yemen), and it connects the Red Sea to the Indian
Ocean via the Gulf of Aden. The strait is an oil transit chokepoint
since most of Europe's crude oil from the Middle East passes
north through Bab el-Mandeb into the Mediterranean via the
Suez Canal.8 3 Closure of the strait due to terrorist activities or for
political/military reasons, could keep tankers from the Persian
Gulf from reaching the Suez Canal and Sumed Pipeline complex,
diverting them around the southern tip of Africa (the Cape of
Good Hope).8 This would add greatly to transit time and cost, and
would effectively tie-up spare tanker capacity. Closure of the Bab
el-Mandeb would effectively block non-oil shipping from using the
Suez Canal.15 In October 2002 the French-flagged tanker Limburg
was attacked off the coast of Yemen by terrorists. 6 During the
78. Reynolds B. Peele, The Importance of Maritime Chokepoints, 27 PARAMETERS 61
(1997), available at http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/97summer/peele.html;
see also FED. RESEARCH Div., LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, IRAQ: A COUNTRY STUDY 233-34 (He-
len Chapin Metz ed., 1990), available at http://memory.loc.gov/frd/cs/iqtoc.html. Thirty-
seven crew members were killed as a result of that Iraqi missile attack on May 17, 1987.
Id. at 240-41. A total of 200 merchant sailors also lost their lives in the years of conflict.
Peele, supra. Over eighty ships were sunk resulting in losses of $2 billion in direct losses
to cargo and hulls. Id.
79. FED. RESEARCH Div., LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, IRAN: A COUNTRY STUDY 277-78 (He-
len Chapin Metz ed., 1989), available at http://memory.loc.gov/frd/cs/irtoc.html.
80. Id. at 38-39 (including Abu Musa, Greater Tunb, and Lesser Tunb Islands); Iran
Asserts Claims to 3 Disputed Islands in Gulf, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 1992, at 16.
81. Energy Info. Admin., supra note 75.
82. U.S. DEPT. OF DEF., NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF
THE SEA 12 (2d ed. 1996).
83. Energy Info. Admin., supra note 75.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.; see also William J. Fallon, Admiral, U.S. Navy, Remarks at the Fourth Annual
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Yom Kippur War in 1973, Egypt closed the strait as a means of
blockading the southern Israeli port of Eilat. 7
The Turkish Straits and Caspian Oil. The term "Turkish
Straits" refers to the two narrow straits in northwestern Turkey,
the Bosporus and the Dardanelles, which connect the Sea of
Marmara with the Black Sea on one side and the Aegean arm of
the Mediterranean Sea on the other. Turkey and Russia have
been locked in a longstanding dispute over passage issues involv-
ing the Turkish Straits.8 The 1936 Montreux Convention puts
Turkey in charge of regulating traffic through the straits; 9 yet
Turkey has been hard pressed to stop an onslaught of Russian,
Ukrainian, and Cypriot tankers, which transport Caspian Sea oil
to markets in Western Europe. 90 Because of the very heavy ship-
ping traffic and very challenging geography, there have been
many collisions and groundings in the past, creating terrible pol-
lution incidents and death.91 Thus far, none of these incidents
have been attributed to state-on-state-conflict or terrorism;92 how-
ever, the confined waterway is an especially attractive target be-
cause of the grave economic and environmental damage that
would result from a well-timed and well-placed attack on a loaded
tanker. The issues surrounding the straits are also a subset of
larger problems associated with the exploitation of Caspian oil,
including severe pollution of the Caspian Sea as a result of im-
prudent extraction techniques, as well as the ever-present poten-
tial for conflict among the various claimants to the Caspian's hy-
drocarbon resources due to an inability of the various Caspian
littoral states to agree on their maritime boundaries-and their
Shangri La Dialogue "Enhancing Maritime Security Cooperation" (June 5, 2005), http://
www.pacom.mil/speeches/sst2005/050606-emsi-Shangrila.shtml.
87. See Youssef H. Aboul-Enein, The Yom Kippur War: Indications and Warnings,
MIL. REV., Jan.-Feb. 2003, at 52, 53 (2003).
88. Energy Info. Admin., supra note 75.
89. Convention Regarding the Regime of the Straits, July 20, 1936, 173 L.N.T.S. 215.
90. See Energy Info. Admin., Country Analysis Briefs: Turkey (Apr. 2009), http://
www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Turkey/Full.html.
91. Id. See generally Mark E. Rosen, The Black Sea and Her Approach-Will There Be
Fair Winds and Following Seas?, in SECURITY FLASHPOINTS: OIL, ISLANDS, SEA ACCESS
AND MILITARY CONFRONTATION 291-309 (Myron H. Nordquist & John Norton Moore eds.,
1998) [hereinafter SECURITY FLASHPOINTS].
92. See Hugh Pope, Turkey Stirs Up a Storm in the Bosporous: Curbs on Waterway
Traffic Anger Old Salts, INDEP. (London), Sept. 18, 1994, http://www.independent.co.uk/
news/world/turkey-stirs-up-a-storm-in-the-bosporus-curbs-on-waterway-traffic-anger-old-
salts-1449623.html.
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legal areas in which to drill.13 Any one of these problems could be-
come a major flashpoint in the future.
China vs. Japan. The Daiyu/Senkaku islands located in the
East China Sea have become an increasingly contentious dispute
because both claimants have, in the past, used modern military
platforms to patrol the areas of their claims in which there are
suspected oil and gas deposits in the seabed.9 4 In September 2005,
for example, China dispatched five warships to disputed waters
surrounding its oil and gas platforms, which were spotted by a
Japanese maritime patrol aircraft.95 There have been other simi-
lar military-to-military encounters.9 6 Given the fact that both
countries have modern armed forces and are comparatively ener-
gy starved, it is not difficult to envision serious conflict erupting
over these disputed areas.
The Arctic Super Highway. Traditionalists would probably not
include the Arctic as a security chokepoint. The oil connection is
reasonably well known: "22 percent of the world's undiscovered
energy reserves are projected to be in the region (including 13
percent of the world's petroleum and 30 percent of natural gas)."97
However, given the very small margins that transporters earn
transporting oil from point A to B, 98 shipping companies are al-
ways in search of shorter routes to transport oil to market. As the
thawing of the Arctic Ocean continues as a result of climate
change, 9  this may create new shipping routes that transporters of
93. See E.T. ZHANBURSHIN & A.B. BIGALIEV, ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS OF WATER
RESOURCES OF THE NEAR-CASPIAN REGION CONNECTED WITH EXTRACTION AND TRANS-
PORTATION OF HYDROCARBONS, http://www.epa.gov/OEM/docs/oil/fss/fssO6/zhanburshin.
pdf (discussing pollution of the Caspian Sea associated with the exploitation of oil) (last
visited Feb. 23, 2010); Mehrdad Haghayeghi, The Coming of Conflict to the Caspian Sea,
50 PROBS. POST-COMMUNISM 32, 33-36 (2003), available at http://www.mthdyoke.edu
courses/siones/242s/restricted/conflict caspian.pdf.
94. See Robert Marquand, Japan-China Tensions Rise Over Tiny Islands, CHRISTIAN
SCI. MONITOR, Feb. 11, 2005, at 1.
95. See Norimitsu Onishi & Howard W. French, Japan's Rivalry with China Is Stir-
ring a Crowded Sea, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2005, at 14.
96. See Marquand, supra note 94.
97. CNA CORP., supra note 5, at 24 (footnote omitted).
98. Letter from Barry T. Hill, Assoc. Dir., U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, to Ralph Regu-
la, Chairman, Subcomm. on Interior & Related Agencies, House Comm. on Appropriations
(Aug. 19, 1998), in U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/RCED-98-242, FEDERAL OIL VAL-
UATION: EFFORTS TO REVISE REGULATIONS AND AN ANALYSIS OF ROYALTIES IN KIND 16
(1998).
99. U.S. ARCTIC RESEARCH COMM'N, REPORT ON GOALS AND OBJECTIVES FOR ARCTIC
RESEARCH (2007), http://www.arctic.gov/publications/usarc_2007_goals.pdf; see also NAT'L
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oil and other goods will use to maximize their profits and minim-
ize their transit times. As supplies of readily exploitable crude oil
are reduced, the probability increases that some of this trade will
result from exploitation activities in the land and littoral areas
adjacent to the Arctic Sea. This development is concerning for a
number of reasons: (1) the area is very remote and could provide
a safe haven to pirates seeking to hijack cargoes; (2) the environ-
mental sensitivity of the area, and the concomitant difficulty of
mounting a cleanup effort, means that an oil spill in that marine
environment will be much more persistent than an oil spill in
temperate waters; 100 (3) the Arctic presents unique navigational
difficulties due to the lack of good charts, navigational aids, and
communications towers, as well as the impacts of extreme cold on
the operational effectiveness of systems;'0 ' (4) the unsettled na-
ture of claims by various countries, including the United States,
to the seabed continental shelf resources in the littoral areas off
their coastlines creates the potential for military competition and
conflict over these claims. 10 2 The International Maritime Organi-
zation ("IMO") is now circulating draft guidelines for ships oper-
ating in Arctic areas to promote-but not require-ship harden-
ing against an iceberg strike, better crew training, and
environmental protection measures. 10 3 These guidelines are mere-
ly advisory and can only be implemented via the flag states.0 4 Al-
so, neither IMO nor any of the UN Law of the Sea Institutions
have mandatory jurisdiction over any of the flashpoint issues re-
PARK SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, MONITORING CLIMATE CHANGE (Dec. 2007),
http://www.nps.gov/dena/naturescience/upload/Monitoring-Climate-Change.pdf ("The Arc-
tic is more sensitive to climate change than perhaps any other place on Earth."); U.S. GEO-
LOGICAL SURVEY, RATES AND EFFECTS OF CLIMATE WARMING AND PERMAFROST THAWING
IN THE YUKON RIVER BASIN: AN ARCTIC BENCHMARK 1, http://ny.water.usgs.gov/projects
climateIYukonClimate.pdf (last visited Feb. 23, 2010) ("In particular, the potential perma-
frost thawing could significantly increase the rate of warming globally.").
100. WORLD WILDLIFE FUND, OIL SPILL RESPONSE CHALLENGES IN ARCTIC WATERS 7
(2007), available at http://www.crrc.unh.edu/workshops/arctic-spill-summit/nuka-oil-spill
_response-report-final-jan_08.pdf.
101. Int'l Maritime Org., Arctic and Antarctic Shipping Safety, Ships Operating in Po-
lar Regions, http://www.imo.org/safety/mainframe.asp?topic-id=1787 (last visited Feb. 23,
2010).
102. See Peter Prows, Tough Love: The Dramatic Birth and Looming Demise of
UNCLOS Property Law (and What Is to Be Done About It), 42 TEX. INT'L L.J. 241, 270 &
n.187 (2007).
103. Int'l Maritime Org., supra note 101 (updating earlier guidelines MSC/Circ. 1056-
MEPC/Circ. 399).
104. See id.; Int'l Maritime Org., Flag State Implementation, http://www.imo.org/safe
ty/mainframe.asp?topic-id=156 (last visited Feb. 23, 2010).
2010]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
lating to competing continental shelf claims in the Arctic, °5 mean-
ing that any disputes will remain unresolved for a long time.
The above is only a selected list of potential flashpoints in
which oil is the main culprit. Disputes between China and six
other nations of the Spratly Islands, and other territories in the
South China Sea, remain unresolved.106 The Spratly Islands could
become a flashpoint in the future, involving the United States or
its allies, because of the proximity of those areas to the major sea
routes to Japan and Korea. 10 7 The strategic straits of Malacca,
Lombok, and Sunda in Southeast Asia are absolutely essential to
the movement of raw materials to Japan, Korea, and China.0 8 Be-
cause of Lombok's depth and strategic location, it is a major tran-
sit route for very large crude carriers that move between the
Middle East and Asia.0 9 Lombok is an undefended waterway that
is only eighteen kilometers in width at its southern opening, mak-
ing it an attractive chokepoint for hijacking or eco-terrorism in
which the waters of the environmentally sensitive Indonesian
archipelago would be held hostage."10
B. Negative Impacts on U.S. Military Readiness and Power
The United States has paid dearly in fighting major conflicts in
the Persian Gulf region that are linked to assuring continued
105. The IMO regulates shipping and not continental shelf claims. Int'l Maritime Org.,
Convention on the International Maritime Organization Summary, http://www.imo.org/
conventions/mainframe.asp?topicid=771 (last visited Feb. 23, 2010). Further, the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea does not provide a method for resolving these
disputes. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982), 1833 U.N.T.S. 397
(1994), available at www.un.orgtDepts/los/convention-agreements/texts/unclos/unclose.
pdf; see also Stephanie Holmes, Comment, Breaking the Ice: Emerging Legal Issues in Arc-
tic Sovereignty, 9 CHI. J. INT'L L. 323, 340, 351 (2008).
106. See Hasjim Djalal, South China Sea Island Disputes, in SECURITY FLASHPOINTS,
supra note 91, at 109, 113-17.
107. Id. at 111-13.
108. Id. at 111-12; see also MICHAEL LEIFER, INTERNATIONAL STRAITS OF THE WORLD:
MALACCA, SINGAPORE, AND INDONESIA 53-59 (1978).
109. Id. at 79-80.
110. See id. at 79. Even though al Qaeda and sympathetic terrorist groups have not
shown a proclivity to attack economic targets, Bin Laden has crowed to foreign audiences
about the disproportionate payout that al Qaeda realized as a result of the 9/11 attacks:
"In 2004 Bin Laden referred to the 9/11 attacks as economic: in his videotape broadcast on
Al Jazeera and posted online, he bragged that Al Qaeda spent $500,000 on the event,
while America lost, 'according to the lowest estimate, $500 billion' .... " See Gabriel Wei-
man, War by Other Means: Econo-Jihad, YALEGLOBAL ONLINE, June 4, 2009, http://yale
global.yale.edu/content/econo-jihad.
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access to oil and keeping oil markets stable.11' One would have
thought that the United States had learned its lesson: "Despite
the global economic downturn that began in the fall of 2008, U.S.
and worldwide energy demand is expected to increase dramatical-
ly in the coming decade."', The United States has made strides in
increasing the fuel efficiency of motor vehicles and effected other
changes that will, in the coming years, lower per capita energy
consumption. 113 However, these positive changes in behavior have
not been sufficient to change the basic fact that the United States
is far too dependent on imported foreign oil, and such overdepen-
dence "tethers America to unstable and hostile regimes, subverts
foreign policy goals, and requires the U.S. to stretch its military
presence across the globe" to preserve its influence and its access
to foreign oil supplies." 4 Over time, U.S. sources of imported oil
have become more diversified and probably will, in time, lessen
U.S. dependence on oil from the Middle East. 5 However, the
same cannot be said about U.S. allies and trading partners."6 Al-
so, the United States has an enduring interest in protecting all of
these markets to ensure price stability of the product and to pre-
vent shortages.
Because the Department of Defense ("DOD") is the largest fuel
user in the country, 7 it is moving aggressively to integrate alter-
native fuels on its bases, ships, and aircraft, and it has been pro-
vided $7.4 billion in "stimulus" appropriations by the American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 ("ARRA") to, among other
things, modernize DOD's energy infrastructure and conduct tar-
111. See CNA CORP., supra note 5, at 7.
112. Id. at 17; see also MICHAEL T. KLARE, BLOOD AND OIL: THE DANGERS AND
CONSEQUENCES OF AMERICA'S GROWING DEPENDENCY ON IMPORTED PETROLEUM 10-11, 16
(2004). The Energy Information Administration, a Department of Energy entity, reported
that 58% of the oil the United States uses is imported, over half of those imports coming
from countries in the Western Hemisphere, including Canada, Mexico, and Venezuela. See
Energy Info. Admin., Energy in Brief: How Dependent Are We on Foreign Oil?, http://ton
to.eia.doe.gov/energy-in brief/foreign_oil dependence.cfm (last visited Feb. 23, 2010).
113. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2009 WITH PROJECTIONS TO
2030, at 31-35, 61 fig.35, 69-70 (2009), available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/aeo/pdf/
0383(2009).pdf.
114. CNA CORP., supra note 5, at 41.
115. Id. at 25-27.
116. See Friedman Muller, Europe Must Diversify Its Energy Sources, TRANSATLANTIC
INTERNATIONAL POLITIK (F.R.G.), Feb. 2003, at 31-36 (arguing that Europe must follow
America's lead); see also KLARE, supra note 112, at 18-20.
117. CNA CORP., supra note 5, at 8.
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geted energy efficiency research and development projects."8
DOD also maintains an Environmental Security Technology Cer-
tification Program to demonstrate and validate innovative tech-
nologies targeting its most urgent environmental needs." 9
Despite positive investments that will eventually lead to more
energy efficient systems, the increased "electrification" of combat
has chained field commanders in Afghanistan to military fuel
lines.20 Further, a myriad of generators, refrigeration units, and
other electrified combat systems need oil or gas to power them. 12
This "tethering" effect creates additional risks because field com-
manders have to be cognizant of the constant threat of ambush or
roadside bombs to convoys of fuel trucks and supply forces in the
field. ,' Conventionally powered naval vessels are, of course, de-
pendent upon a costly and exposed network of supply ships, and
DOD foreign bases exist to provide refueling support for U.S.
ships and warplanes.123 Finally, fluctuations in oil prices greatly
complicate DOD's ability to finance its operations. 124 An increase
of just $10 per barrel in the cost of oil translates into $1.3 billion
in increased costs of operations. 125 These types of price spikes
have clear impacts on readiness since funds have to be shifted
from training and maintenance accounts to pay for fuel.126
C. Negative Impacts on U.S. Economy
Continued U.S. dependence on fossil fuels undermines its eco-
nomic and, in some respects, its political sovereignty. The twelve
million barrels that the United States imports each day to satisfy
domestic demand amounted to a capital outflow of $475 billion in
118. See American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123
Stat. 115; see also U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., AMERICAN RECOVERY AND REINVESTMENT ACT OF
2009: DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE EXPENDITURE PLANS 2 (2009), available at http://www.de
fenselink.mil/recovery/plans-reports/2009/april/DoDARRAFirstReporttoCongress-24
_Mar_09.pdf.
119. Envtl. Sec. Tech. Certification Program, Background and Contact Information for
ESTCP Program, http://www.estcp.org/abouttindex.cfm (last visited Feb. 23, 2010).
120. See CNA CORP., supra note 5, at 9.
121. See id.
122. See id.
123. See id. at 11.
124. See id.
125. Id.
126. See id.
[Vol. 44:977
ENERGY INDEPENDENCE AND CLIMATE CHANGE
2008.127 This heavy dependence on imports puts U.S. economic ac-
tivity at risk if supplies are suddenly cut off for political rea-
sons. 28 There is also good historical data on the correlation be-
tween spikes in oil prices and declines in the U.S. gross domestic
product.129 Looking long-term, to finance this incredible cost to the
U.S. economy, America must borrow heavily.130 At a number of le-
vels, this economic outflow harms U.S. economic security by eli-
minating U.S. economic activity that could otherwise be taxed at
the federal, state, and local levels, while helping to reduce the
burgeoning U.S. government budget deficits. 3' Also, "chronic
trade deficits [due in large part to oil imports] have reduced U.S.
economic growth by at least one percentage point a year, or about
127. PickensPlan, The Plan, http://www.pickensplan.comloilimports (last visited Feb.
23, 2010). The Pickens Plan creates a blueprint to reduce foreign oil dependence by har-
nessing domestic energy alternatives and develop new technologies. Id.
128. See RAND CORP., DOES IMPORTED OIL THREATEN U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY?
(2009), available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/researchbriefs/2009/RANDRB 9448.pdf.
129. See ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ENERGY PRICE IMPACTS ON THE US. ECONOMY (Apr.
2001), available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/economy/energy-price.html. The Energy In-
formation Agency writes:
Looking from the 1970s forward, there are observable, and dramatic changes
in GDP growth as the world oil price has undergone dramatic changes. In the
past year, forecasters have acknowledged that higher energy prices can be-
come a drag on the overall economy. Initially, overall CPI inflation was still
very low, principally because inflation in commodities other than energy and
agriculture was extremely low. However, the sustained high level of oil prices
has begun to effect core inflation (minus energy and food) through continued
pressure on prices of other commodities, in the United States and worldwide.
Id. at 1.
130. See Peter Morici, New American Contract Policy Paper: Recalibrating U.S.-China
(June 11, 2009), http://www.newamerica.net/publications/policy/recalibrating-u-s-china
("With the trade deficit at 5 percent of GDP, Americans must spend 105 percent of what
they earn, or the supply for U.S. goods and services exceeds the demand, inventories of
new homes, cars and other goods mount, layoffs result, and the economy slips into reces-
sion.").
131. See War at Any Cost? The Total Economic Costs of the War Beyond the Federal
Budget, Hearing Before the J. Economic Comm., 110th Cong. 214 (2008) (statement of Ro-
bert D. Hormats, Vice Chairman, Goldman Sachs). In testifying on the true costs of war to
the U.S. economy before the Joint Economic Committee of Congress on February 28, 2008,
Mr. Robert Hormats, Vice Chairman at Goldman Sachs (International) succinctly summa-
rized the macro-economic costs of borrowing to the U.S. economy:
[Blorrowing for war, or for any other current purpose for that matter, will
impose a large debt burden on future generations at a time when federal bor-
rowing in the future will climb dramatically to pay for the skyrocketing costs
of social security and health care for the aged and the poor. These vital but
costly programs will put enormous stress on the Federal budget in coming
decades, causing an additional increase in borrowing and/or taxes .... "
Id. Hormats also noted that such borrowing diverts funds from other productive govern-
ment activities. Id.; see KLARE, supra note 112, at 11.
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25 percent of potential GDP growth."132 Trade deficits ultimately
shift U.S. employment into non-trade competing industries, effec-
tively extinguishing GDP growth potential.
131
D. Impacts on U.S. Sovereignty and the Sustainment of Its
Policies to Promote Democracy
The purchases of imported oil by the United States and other
developed countries have resulted in a huge transfer of wealth to
a relatively small number of countries in which there have been
major shifts in economic and political power.14 These shifts have
caused some undesirable political and security problems for the
United States and have negatively impacted the economies and
political independence of other importers and, in some circums-
tances, the suppliers of oil."35 These impacts are less readily ob-
servable than an attack on an oil rig or a tanker, yet, in the long
run, these impacts may be more dangerous because they under-
mine the economic and political independence of developing and
developed countries, producers and importers.1 6
Iran's exports were estimated at $77 billion in 2008, helping it
to become "the world's 'most active state sponsor of terrorism,'
including funding Hezbollah and insurgent activities in Iraq.1 7
Iran's oil wealth has also created a political wedge between the
United States and its treaty allies, including South Korea, Japan,
and Italy, because U.S. allies cannot afford to divorce themselves
from this supply of oil that powers their respective economies."3
In the 1980s, Saudi Arabia found itself suddenly flush with oil
wealth and began promoting its Sunni fundamentalist interpreta-
tion of Islam-Wahhabism.1 39
The Saudi government, always conscious of its duties as the custo-
dian of Islams' holiest places, joined with wealthy Arabs from the
Kingdom and other states bordering the Persian Gulf in donating
132. Morici, supra note 130.
133. See id.
134. See CNA CORP., supra note 5, at 4.
135. See id.
136. See id.
137. See id. (endnote omitted).
138. See id.
139. 9/11 COMMISSION, supra note 74, at 52.
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money to build mosques and religious schools [in the Gulf region]
that could preach and teach their interpretation of Islamic doc-
trine.
140
This same oil wealth provided money for Osama Bin Laden and al
Qaeda, which operated through a Saudi financial support net-
work known as the Golden Chain. 4 1
Venezuela provides the United States with roughly eleven per-
cent of its oil imports, and Venezuela has "partial or complete
ownership of nine U.S.-based refineries."142 The United States is
Venezuela's largest oil customer, yet President Hugo Chavez
seems to view these interdependencies as a grant of immunity
and has taken license to promote "anti-American and anti-
Western rhetoric both at home and... in parts of Latin and
South America through foreign aid (largely in the form of subsi-
dized oil). . . ,,143 That same oil wealth has enabled Chavez to
squash his political opposition and censor the press in his coun-
try. 44
E. Dutch Disease
Oil also has a corrosive effect on the countries that export it.
"While oil can enable some nations to flex their muscles, it can al-
so have a destabilizing effect on their economic, social, and politi-
cal infrastructure."15 In many cases, the discovery of oil or gas
deposits and subsequent reliance on them for income "can bring
about 'Dutch Disease,' an economic condition that can occur when
a nation's large endowment of a natural resource attracts all cap-
ital away from other sectors. . . . 146 For example, even though
140. Id.
141. See id. at 55.
142. CNA CORP., supra note 5, at 3 (footnotes omitted).
143. See id.
144. See id.
145. See id. at 5.
146. See id.
The term was coined in the Netherlands in the early 1960s, after the Dutch
discovered huge deposits of natural gas in the North Sea. What happens in a
country with Dutch disease is this: First the value of the currency rises,
thanks to the sudden influx of cash from oil, gold, gas, diamonds, or some
other natural resource discovery .... The citizens, flush with cash, start buy-
ing cheaper imported goods without restraint; the domestic manufacturing
sector gets wiped out; and, presto, you have deindustrialization.
FRIEDMAN, supra note 11, at 98-99.
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Russia has incredible natural resources and a talented and well-
educated population, Russia's heavy reliance on oil and gas ex-
ports has held it back.4 7 Factors that help explain this phenome-
non include the heavy concentration of oil officials in the central
government and an economy that is moribund because it lacks di-
versification. 8 Venezuela also suffers from "Dutch disease" in
that most of its gross domestic product and public spending are
dependent upon oil revenues, which can fluctuate wildly based on
global oil prices. 149 Nigeria has significant oil resources, although
it too suffers from extreme poverty, lack of infrastructure, ram-
pant inflation, and political corruption because its wealth is con-
centrated in the hands of very few individuals and is not used to
fund local improvements in infrastructure, which is needed to at-
tract foreign capital, or to stimulate diversified local businesses.150
F. Oil, Lack of Energy, and Developing Countries
Heavy reliance on imported oil has bad security and economic
impacts on developed countries, such as the United States.151 For
developing countries the situation is worse: "Developing countries
suffer more than the developed countries from oil price increases
because they generally use energy less efficiently and because
energy-intensive manufacturing accounts for a larger share of
their GDP."" 2 Furthermore, they have much less ability to switch
to alternative fuels. 5 3 Developing countries that import oil are
more harmed by price increases in terms of sustaining their li-
mited economic activities and agricultural sectors, resulting in in-
flation and, necessarily, higher food costs. 5 4 Indonesia, for exam-
ple, "spends more money today subsidizing gasoline and cooking
147. See CNA CORP., supra note 5, at 3.
148. See Robert E. Looney, The Impact of Defense Expenditure on Industrial Develop-
ment in the Arab Gulf, 30 MIDDLE E. STUD. 377, 379-80 (1994) (describing how govern-
ment expenditures may retard industrial development by removing managerial skills and
talent from the civilian sector and producing the "Dutch Disease effect").
149. CNA CORP., supra note 5, at 5.
150. See id.; Xavier Sala-i-Martin & Arvind Subramanian, Addressing the Natural Re-
source Curse: An Illustration from Nigeria §§ 1, 3 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Work-
ing Paper No. 9804, 2003), available at http://papers.nber.org/papers/w9804.pdf.
151. See ROBERT L. HIRSCH ET AL., PEAKING OF WORLD OIL PRODUCTION: IMPACTS,
MITIGATION, & RISK MANAGEMENT 28 (2005), available at http://www.netl.doe.gov/publica
tions/others/pdf/OilPeaking-NETL.pdf.
152. Id. at 30.
153. Id.
154. See id.
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oil products for its people (30 percent of the national budget) than
providing them with an education (6 percent of the national
budget)." 155 Also, according to the International Monetary Fund,
the high costs of oil have stimulated demand for commodities
such as palm, corn, and rapeseeds oil for biofuel.'56 As a result,
there have been concomitant worldwide increases in the prices for
edible and other commodities, due to a spillover effect.1 57 Food
riots are now commonplace in some countries in Africa.'
The World Summit on Sustainable Development ("Summit")
met in Johannesburg in 2002 to chart a path to global sustainable
development. 5 9 Among other developments, the Summit commis-
sioned UN-Energy to study the role of energy and sustainable de-
velopment."'° Worldwide, 1.6 billion people lack access to electrici-
ty, and 2.4 billion people still rely on traditional biomass fuels,
lacking access to modern fuels, for cooking and heating. 6' In fact,
"[h]undreds of millions of people-mainly women and children-
spend several hours daily gathering fuelwood and water" from
distant locations to support their basic needs.162 UN-Energy is-
sued its 2005 paper, The Energy Challenge for Achieving Millen-
nium Development Goals, to more accurately quantify the connec-
tion between lack of access to clean energy and the inputs that
lead to global warming and state collapse, particularly from the
viewpoint of human and economic development. 61 Its findings
were not that surprising: access to clean and inexpensive energy
is essential to create mechanical power for agro-processing and
155. FRIEDMAN, supra note 11, at 312.
156. Int'l Monetary Fund, Impact of High Food and Fuel Prices on Developing Coun-
tries-Frequently Asked Questions (Sept. 11, 2009), http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr
/faq/ffpfaqs.htm. The same can also be said about demand for palm oil, which is used as a
source of biofuel. Shang-Wen Liu, Palm Plantations Driving Destruction: Why Unilever
Now Supports a Halt to Deforestation, GREEN INVESTMENT, June 2008, at 4, available at
http://www.greenpeace.org/raw/content/china/en/campaigns/green-investmentissue-2/gree
n-investment-issue-02.pdf. Palm plantations are the leading cause of deforestation in In-
donesia and elsewhere in the developing world. Id. at 4-5.
157. Int'l Monetary Fund, supra note 156.
158. Id.
159. United Nations: Johannesburg Summit 2002, http://www.un.org/jsummit/html/
basic info/basicinfo.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2010).
160. See Mats Karlsson, Preface to UN-ENERGY, THE ENERGY CHALLENGE FOR ACHIEV-
ING THE MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS 1 (2005), available at http://esa.un.org/un-
energy/pdffUN-ENRG%20paper.pdf.
161. UN-ENERGY, supra note 160, at 2.
162. Id. at 3.
163. See id. at 1, 3.
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transport, refrigeration, health care, telecommunications, and
education.164 UN-Energy seemed to find a high correlation among
the lack of modern fuels, electricity, and environmental sustaina-
bility. 16' Also, diversion of the population's productive time to en-
gage in basic "gathering" activities perpetuates the vicious cycle
of desperate poverty because it takes away time from progressive
economic activity and education.16 Further, inadequate "clean
electrons," such as fuelwood, contribute to disease (due to expo-
sure to unvented indoor cooking), the loss of natural habitats
from the clearing of forests and foliage, and--one can postulate-
accelerate climate change.167
There have been some limited success stories. Thomas L.
Friedman writes about the village of Aek Nbara in Northern Su-
matra Indonesia in which much of the adjacent tropical rain for-
est, home to the endangered orangutan, was at threat of destruc-
tion due to deforestation.1 18 Through a coalition between USAID
and Conservation International, workshops were held to convince
villagers that they were far better off economically preserving the
forest floor for the growth of export crops (cinnamon, cloves, and
sugar) and ecotourism. 169 Additionally, USAID seed money (ap-
proximately $1 million) and matching funds from private donors
are now being used to buy out the loggers' timber lease and invest
in a new geothermal electric energy project, which will supply
power to local villagers and nearby towns in Sumatra.170 Accord-
ing to Friedman, the key to the success of these efforts is
"buil[ding] locally, with local investment and local players," and
using clean electrons.17 1
For the United States, its allies, and trading partners, every
problem in the developing world is also an energy problem. With-
out electricity, more people will be forced into overcrowded slums
in megacities, like Mumbai or Lagos, which are perfect incubators
of disease.12 The impacts of climate change will have concomitant
164. See id. at 3.
165. See id. at 7-8.
166. Id. at 6 (noting that lack of access to modern fuels and electricity disproportionate-
ly burdens women, thereby harming their literacy and economic opportunities).
167. See id. at 3, 8.
168. FRIEDMAN, supra note 11, at 304-05.
169. See id. at 305-07.
170. Id. at 305, 307-08.
171. Id. at 312-15.
172. See LISA BENTON-SHORT & JOHN RENNIE SHORT, CITIES AND NATURE 67-68, 89-
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impacts on those in the countryside: greater incidence of disease,
deforestation, and loss of remaining clean freshwater supplies
due to migration of peoples to higher ground.173 These problems in
the third world quickly become first world problems because of
the relative ease by which disease and invasive species can
spread to people and agriculture through relatively unrestricted
and inexpensive international travel. Of course, as those diseases
and invasive species mutate, vaccines and other countermeasures
become ineffective.' The results are, at a minimum, very costly
and sometimes deadly if the spread of mutated diseases rises to
pandemic levels. The bottom line is that without electricity, the
adaptation of states at risk of collapse to these extremes of cli-
mate change is only going to be that much more difficult.
IV. THE IMPACT OF CLIMATE CHANGE ON
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
The impacts of climate change on international peace and secu-
rity are increasingly well-documented. CNA's National Security
and the Threat of Climate Change detailed a wide range of na-
tional and international security impacts associated with climate
change, including mass migration, scarcity, increased conflicts,
and severe public health challenges. 175 Also, in June 2008 the
Bush administration produced a National Intelligence Assess-
ment ("NIA") concerning the effects of climate change on national
security. 176 According to Dr. Thomas Fingar, the Chairman of the
91 (2008).
173. See Lori M. Hunter, Climate Change, Rural Vulnerabilities, and Migration,
POPULATION REFERENCE BUREAU, June 2007, http://www.prb.org/Articles/2007/Climate
ChangeinRuralAreas.aspx. See generally Anthony McMichael et al., Human Health (U.
Confalonieri & A. Woodward eds.), in CLIMATE CHANGE 2001: IMPACTS, ADAPTATIONS, AND
VULNERABILITY 1151 (James J. McCarthy et al., eds., 2001).
174. See, e.g., Centers for Disease Control and Preventions, Seasonal Flu Vaccine
Questions and Answers, http://www.cdc.gov/Flu/about/qa/fluvaccine.htm (last visited Feb.
23, 2010) (describing how to guard against the seasonal flu, an example of the effects of
disease mutation).
175. CNA CORP., supra note 2, at 6.
176. National Intelligence Assessment on the National Security Implications of Global
Climate Change to 2030: Hearing Before the H. Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence
and the House Select Comm. on Energy Independence and Global Warming, 110th Cong.
2-3 (2008) (statement for the record of Thomas Fingar, Deputy Director, National Intelli-
gence for Analysis and Chairman, National Intelligence Council), [hereinafter NIA: Fingar
Statement) available at http://www.dni.gov/testimonies/20080625_testimony.pdf; Nat'l In-
telligence Council, The Impact of Climate Change to 2030, http://www.dni.gov/nic/special
_climate2030.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2010); see also Kevin Whitelaw, Intelligence Re-
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National Intelligence Council and a key participant in the NIA's
production,
We judge global climate change will have wide-ranging implications
for US national security interests over the next 20 years .... We
judge that the most significant impact for the United States will be
indirect and result from climate-driven effects on many other coun-
tries and their potential to seriously affect US national security in-
terests. ... Climate change could threaten domestic stability in some
states, potentially contributing to intra- or, less likely, interstate
conflict, particularly over access to increasingly scarce water re-
sources. We judge that economic migrants will perceive additional
reasons to migrate because of harsh climates, both within nations
and from disadvantaged to richer countries.'77
It is indeed unfortunate that the issues associated with climate
change and its connection with the burning of fossil fuels and in-
dustrial and human activity has been so mischaracterized and po-
liticized for so long. The 2007 release of the Fourth Assessment
Report by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
("IPCC")'7 has been praised due to its "well balanced and mod-
erate" findings'7 9 that global warming is an unequivocal pheno-
mena with "'virtually certain' impacts on ecosystems, water re-
sources, human health, industry, settlement, and society. These
effects will vary from region to region and ... be difficult to pre-
port Assesses Impact of Climate Change: Environmental Change Will Trigger New Issues
for U.S. National Security, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., June 24, 2008, http://www.us news.
com/articles/news/national/2008/06/24/intelligence-report-assesses-impact-of-climate-chan
ge.htm.
177. NIA: Fingar Statement , supra note 176, at 4-5. "The NIA focuses on the implica-
tions of global climate change for US national security interests by 2030." Id. at 3.
178. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE [IPCC], IPCC FOURTH
ASSESSMENT REPORT: CLIMATE CHANGE 2007 (2007), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/
publications and -datalpublicationsand.data.reports.htm. The IPCC performs the secre-
tariat and technical functions for all parties to the 1982 United Nations Framework Con-
vention on Climate Change ("UNFCCC" or "FCCC"). See IPCC, Organization, History,
http:l www.ipcc.chlorganization/organization-history.htm (last visited Feb. 23, 2010). The
UNFCCC adopted the Kyoto Protocol, encouraging states to reduce greenhouse gas emis-
sions but not mandating such a result. U.N. FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE
CHANGE [UNFCCC], FACT SHEET: KYOTO PROTOCOL, http://unfccc.int/files/press/backgrou
nders/application/pdf/fact_ sheet the-kyoto-protocol.pdf (last visited Feb. 23, 2010). Kyoto,
which expires in 2012, will undergo review at the upcoming UN Climate Change Confe-
rence in Copenhagen, Denmark in December 2009. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec. 10, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 32; Provisional
Agenda, UNFCCC, Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the
Kyoto Protocol, Fifth Session, Copenhagen, 7-18 December 2009, U.N. Doc. FCCC/
KP/CMP/ 2009, U.N. Doc. FCCC/KP/CMP/2009/1 (Sept. 16, 2009).
179. RYMN J. PARSONS, TAKING UP THE SECURITY CHALLENGE OF CLIMATE CHANGE 1
(2009), available at http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffilesPUB932.pdf.
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dict.. .. "8o The report also added clarity to the effects on the gen-
eral security environment, which will be stressed by declining
amounts of arable land, drought, desertification, loss of biodiver-
sity, sea level rise, water shortages, population displacements,
and health crises.'8 ' These issues will likely become global in
scope as a result of overcrowding in mega-cities and uncontrolled
migration trends, which will have effects on developed and devel-
oping countries. In one respect, the United States had a strong
taste of this problem when Hurricane Katrina, an extraordinary
category three hurricane, hit New Orleans in 2005 causing $81
billion in property damage, loss of life, and other serious disrup-
tions.'8 2
A. Patterns Among the "Up and Comers"
Another dimension of current U.S. consumption habits is the
effect our patterns of consumption have had upon those emerging
economy states that seek to emulate our standard of living. This
is certainly the case with states like China and India, who
rightfully assert that they should be able to enjoy the same sort of
energy-affluent lifestyle.'83 A drive on the streets of Beijing today
displays many thousands of large, late model Mercedes, BMWs,
Audis, Lexus', Buicks, and a sizeable number of gas-guzzling
SUVs and minivans.114 China is aware of this trend and is taking
aggressive action to move from oil and coal to wind, hydroelectric,
and solar generation.' 5 It remains an open question, however,
whether China's central government will be able to dampen the
desire of its nouveau riche to switch from a Mercedes Benz to a
Toyota Prius. The overall trend is not good as it relates to GHG
emissions resulting from the increased use of coal and other fossil
fuels:
180. Id. at 2 (citation omitted).
181. See id.
182. RICHARD D. KNABB ET AL., TROPICAL CYCLONE REPORT: HURRICANE KATRINA 1, 12
(2005), available at http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/pdf/TCR-AL122005_Katrina.pdf.
183. See Jad Mouawad, Cuts Urged in China's and India's Energy Growth, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 7, 2007, at C3.
184. See Keith Bradsher, Beijing Pressures Automakers to Improve Efficiency. N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 21, 2008, at C2 (describing the high sales of these types of automobiles in
China).
185. Howard W. French, Huitengxile Journal; In Search of a New Energy Source, Chi-
na Rides the Wind, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 2005, at A4 (noting China's goal to supply 10% of
its energy needs from renewable energy sources by 2020).
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World carbon dioxide emissions are projected to rise from 29.0 billion
metric tons in 2006 to 33.1 billion metric tons in 2015 and 40.4 bil-
lion metric tons in 2030-an increase of 39 percent over the projec-
tion period. With strong economic growth and continued heavy re-
liance on fossil fuels expected for most of the non- [Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development ("OECD")] economies, much
of the increase in carbon dioxide emissions is projected to occur
among the developing, non-OECD nations." 6
The problem, however, is that this dilemma problem is not li-
mited to India and China. Friedman writes:
"Americans" are popping up all over now-from Doha to Dalian
and from Calcutta to Casablanca to Cairo, moving into American-
style living spaces, buying American-style cars, eating American
style fast food, and creating American levels of garbage....
Cities all over the world have caught America's affluenza... [such
that] "by 2030... we will have gone from a world of two Americums
to a world of eight or nine.""8 7
This outbreak in affluence represents a triumph for U.S. policy
favoring economic globalization because it represents the best op-
portunity for all states to advance economically. The unintended
consequence of this effort is that this advancement comes at the
expense of the planet. Newly affluent states, especially India, are
relying upon coal-fired plants to satisfy their burgeoning energy
demands. 88 This led to a 2004 headline in the Christian Science
Monitor stating that the approximately 850 plants being con-
structed each year in China, India, and the United States threat-
en to "bury Kyoto" by a factor of five times the cap in carbon dio-
xide emissions envisioned in the Kyoto Treaty. 18 Given recent
developments in the United States-including the decline in the
price of natural gas, 90 legislative incentives to move away from
186. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., INTERNATIONAL ENERGY OUTLOOK: 2009, at 6 (2009),
available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/ieo/pdf/O484(2009).pdf.
187. FRIEDMAN, supra note 11, at 56. The term "Americum" refers to "any group of 350
million people with a per capita income above $15,000 and a growing penchant for consu-
merism." Id.
188. See ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 186, at 51-52.
189. See Mark Clayton, New Coal Plants Bury 'Kyoto,' CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Dec.
23, 2004, at 1, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2004/1223/pOlsO4-sten.html. "Coal
can provide usable energy at a cost of between $1 and $2 per MMBtu compared to $6 to
$12 per MMBtu for oil and natural gas," and coal prices are relatively stable. MASS. INST.
TECH., THE FUTURE OF COAL: OPTIONS FOR A CARBON-CONSTRAINED WORLD 12 (2007),
available at http://web.mit.edu/coal/TheFutureofCoal.pdf. It is estimated that 68% of
incremental world coal demand through 2030 will come from China and India. Id. at 63.
190. See Clifford Krauss, Natural Gas, Suddenly Abundant, is Cheaper, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 21, 2009, at B1.
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coal generation plants, 9' and cap-and-trade restrictions at the
state level' 2 -it is likely that the number of new coal-fired plants
in the United States will probably level off. But this slow down of
coal-fired plants in the United States is not likely to be repeated
in countries like India because they lack the resources to invest in
alternative fuels and need power now in order to correct serious
problems in the availability and reliability of electricity. 93
B. Climate Change and the Developing World
CNA's National Security and the Threat of Climate Change
tracked the global impacts of climate change as well as its im-
pacts on national security.'94 The report postulated that human
civilization has flourished because "the world's climate has been
relatively stable. However, when climates change significantly or
environmental conditions deteriorate to the point that necessary
resources are not available, societies become stressed, sometimes
to the point of collapse."' 95 The projected impacts of climate
change include impaired access to fresh water for agriculture and
human consumption,196 loss of arable lands due to flooding 197 or
desertification, 9 8 and violent weather causing large population
191. See, e.g., Energy Policy Act of 2005, § 411, 42 U.S.C. § 15971 (2006); see also Felici-
ty Barringer, Climate Legislation Sends Chill Through Areas Fueled by Coal, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 9, 2009, at A17.
192. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38 § 580-B (Supp. 2008).
193. The Energy Information Administration has stated:
India suffers from a severe shortage of electric capacity. According to the
World Bank, roughly 40 percent of residences in India are without electricity.
In addition, blackouts are a common occurrence throughout the country's
main cities. The World Bank also reports that one-third of Indian businesses
believe that unreliable electricity is one of their primary impediments to
doing business....
... India is both the third-largest consumer and third-largest producer of coal
in the world, and although the country can supply the bulk of its needs do-
mestically, it is currently a net importer of coal.
Energy Info. Admin., Country Analysis Briefs: India 9 (2009), http://www.eia.doe.gov/
emeu/cabs/India/pdf.pdf. Given India's relative abundance of coal and the great amount of
ground that they make up in terms of providing its population reliable access to electricity,
it is hard to envision a major shift in India's consumptive patterns.
194. See CNA CORP., supra note 2, at 1.
195. Id. at 13 (citing DIAMOND, supra note 11, at 7).
196. See id.
197. See id.
198. See id. at 15.
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displacements. 199 Large population displacements seem inevitable
since over two-thirds of the world's population lives in coastal
areas.20 1 In addition to loss of lands used for agriculture and habi-
tat,1 1 another concern is that fresh water supplies in rivers and
aquifers will become contaminated because of saltwater intru-
sion.20 2
Changes in rainfall, snowfall, snowmelt, and salt water conta-
mination of water supplies are almost certain to be a future cause
of tension.203 One author calls water the "new oil" and describes
the situation as follows:
Ethiopia and Kenya [are] two countries at the forefront of the world's
coming water crisis. The director of a local water [Non-Governmental
Organization ("NGO")] told me a few days after I arrived in Ethiopia
in January 2008, "As you may know, Alex, the coming World War III
will be fought over water, not oil." Variations on that refrain were
echoed by aid workers and researchers across the region over the
next several months. Women walk for miles each day to collect
drinking water; farmers are pushed into deadly conflict by dwindling
river flows, and city water supplies are drained by overzealous irri-
gation.20
4
Competition for freshwater resources is a potential source of
major new conflict between Uganda and Kenya due to the very
real prospect that Lake Victoria, the world's second largest lake,
will dry up.205 If this occurs, it could endanger thirty million East
Africans that live around the lake, and set off, at a minimum, a
new mass migration pattern.0 6 The situation has gotten so despe-
rate that "Kenyans chasing fish into deeper Ugandan waters have
been arrested and allegedly tortured by Ugandan military."2 °7
Lake Victoria is also the main reservoir for the Nile River sys-
tem. That system has been used for agriculture for over 5000
199. Id. at 13.
200. Id. at 16.
201. See id.
202. Id. at 16.
203. Salt water intrusion is a particular problem for the Palestinian residents of the
Gaza Strip. Id. at 30.
204. Alex Stonehill, World Water Crisis, Z MAG., June 2008, http://www.zmag.org/z
mag/viewArticle/17805.
205. See id. Drought conditions in central Africa and diversion of river marine sources
for hydroelectric projects are cited as among the principal culprits for the alarming drop in
the water levels. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
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years and supports nine countries: Egypt, Ethiopia, Sudan, Tan-
zania, Kenya, Uganda, Burundi, Rwanda, and the Democratic
Republic of Congo.2 °s These are among "the world's poorest na-
tions and their populations are exploding, increasing stress on
endangered water resources.""9
The conflict in Darfur arose between herders and farmers after
which "[11ong periods of drought resulted in the loss of both farm-
land and grazing land to the desert... compel[ling] the nomads
to migrate southward in search of water and herding ground, and
that in turn led to conflict with the farming tribes. ."... ,210 As is
well known, Darfur has been the world's most recent venue for
significant acts of genocide. 211
The snowmeit in the Himalayan Mountains currently supplies
major river systems in Asia, including the Indus, Ganges, Me-
kong, Yangtze, and Yellow.2 12 If there is continued decline in the
summer melt of mountain glaciers, it would put at risk an esti-
mated 40% of the world's population. 21 The melting of glaciers in
the Peruvian and Venezuelan Andes Mountains is also a concern
since they provide drinking water and hydroelectric power for
much of South America. 214 Mozambique and Nigeria's Niger Del-
ta, home to millions, is especially vulnerable to sea level rises and
storm surges. 215 Any one of these issues could erupt into serious
conflict in which the U.S. military may need to intervene to pre-
vent genocide, confront a totalitarian regime, or to contain the ef-
fects of state collapse. 216 Today, then, we can add global warming
as a major new factor-in addition to others relating to oil-
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. CNA CORP., supra note 2, at 15.
211. See generally id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 32.
215. Id. at 22.
216. Past U.S. interventions include Liberia in 1996 following state collapse; Haiti in
1994-95 when the government disintegrated; and Somalia when the central government
collapsed and was displaced by warlords. RICHARD F. GRIMMET, INSTANCES OF THE USE
OF ARMED FORCES ABROAD 1798-2008, at 15-18 (2009), available at http://www.fas.orgl
sgp/crs/natsec/RL3217-pdf. Current intervention includes U.S. Navy operations in African
waters to suppress piratical activity due to an absence of a viable coastal government to
curtail pirate attacks that are being launched from the land. See Press Release, U.S. Navy
Lt. Jennifer Cragg, Navy Task Force, Partner Nations Deter Pirate Attacks (Jan. 30,
2009), available at http://www.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story-id=42236.
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which can, and probably will, lead to state collapse and to which
the U.S. military may be ordered to intervene in response to do-
mestic or international pressure. Also, given the impacts of the
"Great Recession" of 2008-2010 on the world's economies, and on
donor communities in particular, the global capacity to mobilize
humanitarian assistance to respond with "soft power" to control
these calamitous situations is increasingly called into question,
thereby raising the specter of increasingly violent situations that
can threaten domestic and international national security.
V. A REPORT CARD FOR THE UNITED STATES
Applying both Diamond's five-point typology and the lessons of
failed states will hopefully suggest: (1) the types of policy and le-
gal steps which are necessary to avoid collapse and (2) the timing
of those actions. Unfortunately, time does not appear to be an ally
given the greatly increasing emissions by emerging economies.2 17
Moreover, the physical impacts of climate change seem to be acce-
lerating from so-called "feedback loops." 218 In a feedback loop, the
melting of the arctic permafrost could cause the release of billions
of tons of carbon dioxide and methane, over twenty times more
potent a producer of GHG. 219 An added consequence of this dy-
namic is that the oceans are becoming much more acidic because
of the presence of ambient carbon, which reduces their ability to
absorb carbon resulting from human activity.220
For the above reasons, several of the factors leading to state
collapse could be intensified. If these conditions greatly worsen, it
would threaten U.S. survival in the long term and its standard of
living in the short term. The application of Diamond's model to
the United States is assessed as follows:
Environmental Damage-Viewed in isolation, this is an area
where the United States has made considerable progress, and it
is not likely to be a source of collapse. Several challenges poten-
tially will arise from intensive agricultural activities designed to
compensate for the loss of arable land and the pollution asso-
217. See NASA, Fossil Fuel C02 Emissions Up by 29 Percent Since 2000, Nov. 17, 2009,
http://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/Newsroom/view.php?id=41393.
218. Kari Lydersen, Scientists: Pace of Climate Change Exceeds Estimates, WASH.
POST., Feb. 15, 2009, at A3.
219. Id.
220. Id.
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ciated with intensive fertilizer use and livestock waste.221 Howev-
er, the established regulatory systems, the increasingly prevalent
environmental ethic, and the science and technology base of the
United States, are probably sufficient to prevent these issues
from becoming a significant factor leading to collapse or decline.
Result: Not a Risk Factor.
Climate Change-Portions of the United States' coastlines will
be subject to inundation resulting in internal population migra-
tions.222 Also, coastal areas are likely to be hit hard because of the
growth of ocean "dead zones," 223 the deaths of coral reefs that
serve as incubators of marine life,224 and the decline of phytop-
lankton that are a primary food supply for all marine life. 225
Scientists suggest that, at a minimum, the loss of land and severe
decline in oceanic life will make food far more expensive because
of the loss of seafood as a source of protein.226 Loss of coastal areas
in the United States will most likely fuel internal migration,
which may create some localized pockets of violence in low-
income areas,227 such as those now being experienced along the
221. See CHANGES IN LAND USE AND LAND COVER: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 154-55 (Wil-
liam B. Meyer & B. L. Turner II eds., 1994) (discussing how rural land is being taxed by
urban development and the implications of large-scale farms).
222. See How Global Warming May Affect U.S. Beaches, Coastline, SCI. DAILY, Nov. 24,
2008, http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2008/11081122083051.htm (scientists from
UC San Diego finding that "[1]and in some areas of the Atlantic and Gulf coasts of the
United States will simply be underwater").
223. See David Perlman, Scientists Alarmed by Ocean Dead-Zone Growth, S.F. CHRON.,
Aug. 15, 2008, at Al. ("Dead zones where fish and most marine life can no longer survive
are spreading across the continental shelves of the world's oceans at an alarming rate as
oxygen vanishes from coastal waters .... "); Bina Venkataraman, Rapid Growth Found in
Oxygen-Starved Ocean 'Dead Zones,' N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 2008, at A13 ("Many coastal
areas of the world's oceans are being starved of oxygen at an alarming rate, with vast
stretches along the seafloor depleted of it to the point that they can barely sustain marine
life....").
224. See Joshua Reichert, The Death of Coral Reefs, S.F. CHRON., July 20, 2001, at A25
("[O]ne quarter of the world's reefs have already been lost, and those remaining are under
stress from pollution, sedimentation, destructive fishing practices and global climate
change.").
225. See Andrew S. Brierley & Michael J. Kingsford, Impacts of Climate Change on
Marine Organisms and Ecosystems, 19 CURRENT BIOLOGY R602, R608 (2009) ("In the
North Atlantic, phytoplankton biomass might collapse by half....").
226. See generally Brian J. Rothschild, How Bountiful are Ocean Fisheries?, 2 CONSE-
QUENCES (Winter 1996), http://www.gcrio.org/CONSEQUENCES/winter96/oceanfish.html
(discussing the impact of global warming on global fish population distribution).
227. Rafael Reuveny, Climate Change-Induced Migration and Violent Conflict, 26 POL.
GEOGRAPHY 656, 657, 658-61 (2007) (discussing how climate change can speed up migra-
tions resulting in violent conflict under certain circumstances).
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Mexican border.22 Increasingly violent storm patterns-like Hur-
ricane Katrina-will stress the United States' response capabili-
ties and economy. 229 Result: A Risk Factor.
Hostile Neighbors-The threat of armed attack against the
United States is probably quite low, due in part to its geographic
isolation and formidable defenses. However, the dangers of un-
checked illegal immigration into the United States or terrorists
infiltrating with migrants cannot be reasonably discounted. Ac-
cording to the Foreign Policy rankings, there are only two coun-
tries south of the United States that are not in a "danger" or
"borderline" situation.230 Several of the countries in Central Amer-
ica, many states in the Caribbean, and some in South America
are in a high risk category. 231 If one of these states collapsed, the
U.S. government would probably find it militarily necessary to in-
tervene in order to help stabilize the consequences of that state's
collapse, as well as to prevent mass migration into the United
States. Even if forceful military intervention was not required,
the tragic earthquake in Haiti in 2010 vividly demonstrates that
the cash-strapped federal budget cannot indefinitely sustain the
direct ($400 million as of January 29, 2010) and indirect costs of
responding to the calamitous events involving failed states. 232
Since such mass migration would probably involve people already
228. Namely, the drug-related violence plaguing the city of Juarez. See David Luhnow
& Jose de C6rdota, Amid Rising Violence, Mexicans Fight Back, WALL ST. J., Nov. 6, 2009,
at A12.
229. Another interesting potential risk factor (which will have divisive political and
economic impacts) is to the U.S. legal system. In Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, No. 07-60756,
2009 WL 3221493, at *2 (5th Cir. Oct. 16, 2004), the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
ruled that a group of Mississippi landowners could move forward with their lawsuit for
'nuisance, trespass and negligence" against a group of fossil fuel, chemical, and energy
companies who were allegedly responsible for GHG emissions that had increased the
damage of the storm. Id. The lawsuit was previously dismissed by the District Court, but
the three-judge panel held that federal law permits landowners the legal standing to at-
tempt to prove the linkage between GHGs and Hurricane Katrina. Id. at *4, 20. Writing
for the court, Judge Dennis expressed doubt that the plaintiffs would ever be able to estab-
lish causation (proximate cause) between any of the defendant's activities and Hurricane
Katrina. Id. at *20.
230. See The Failed States Index 2009, ranking Argentina and Chile both as "stable," in
stark contrast to the other countries of South America. Foreign Policy, The Failed States
Index 2009-Interactive Map and Ranks, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/06/22/
2009_- failed-states indexinteractive_map andrankings (last visited Feb. 23, 2010) [he-
reinafter Failed States-Interactive Map].
231. See id.
232. See Michelle Faul, French President Sarkozy Announces Haiti Aid Plan,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Feb. 17, 2010, http://license.icopyright.net/user/viewFreeUse.act?fuid=
NzEzNjE1OQ%3D%3D.
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living at a subsistence level, the costs to the United States of pro-
viding education and other social support would be great and
could lead to localized declines in the standard of living and loca-
lized areas of conflict. Also, continued dependence on imported oil
will perpetuate the risks of interstate conflict, terrorist activities
associated with preserving access to and transporting imported
oil, and wealth transfers involved in the sale. Result: A signifi-
cant risk factor for military involvement and other major economic
and social costs to the United States.
Decreased Support from Friendly Neighbors-States that are
not in a "high risk" category, like Mexico, 23 3 are not likely to act as
a willing buffer to control the mass migration that is probable
from South and Central America to the United States.21 Also, the
states in South and Central America that are high-risk are less
likely to adopt sustainable development policies if they perceive
that they must take shortcuts to feed their people because of rap-
id mass migration. Consequently, "borderline" states may be
much less willing in the future to curtail illegal logging and farm-
ing in rainforest areas if those states perceive that they must al-
low these activities to sustain their populations. Apart from the
risk of mass migration associated with habitat collapses, there is
the added risk that the loss of the rainforest may negatively af-
fect weather patterns in North America.235 This may aggravate
the overall issue of climate change, resulting in costly storms that
will damage U.S infrastructure and cause loss of life. Result: A
Risk Factor.
233. See Failed States-Interactive Map, supra note 230 (ranking Mexico only as "bor-
derline").
234. Cf. KOKO WARNER ET AL., IN SEARCH OF SHELTER: MAPPING THE EFFECTS OF
CLIMATE CHANGE ON HuMAN MIGRATION AND DISPLACEMENT 1, 7 (2009), http://www.care.
org/getinvolved/advocate/pdfs/MigrationReport.pdf (discussing the inextricable link be-
tween climate change and international migration and noting the acute vulnerability of
Mexico and Central America to climate change); Jock Baker et al., Hotspots-Predictions
and Action, 31 FORCED MIGRATION REV. 44, 44-45 (2008) (identifying South and Central
America as hotspots "at higher risk of future population displacement as a result of cli-
mate hazards"); William A. V. Clark, Social and Political Contexts of Conflict, 31 FORCED
MIGRATION REV. 22, 23 (2008) (noting that environmental stress in "high risk" nations like
South America will influence migration patterns).
235. See EDWIN K. SCHNEIDER, AMAZON DEFORESTATION IN CFS 4-6 (Apr. 22, 2009)
(Climate Test Bed Joint Seminar Series, Nat'l Weather Service Climate Prediction Cen-
ter), available at http://www.nws.noaa.gov/ost/climate/STIP/FY09CTBSeminars/eschneid
er_042209.htm.
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Ability of Society to Adapt-Because of the political pluralism
in the United States, significant inertia must be overcome to
enact the political and legal changes necessary to address all of
the problems associated with climate change and excess depen-
dence on imported oil. This is in direct contrast to some states, for
example, China, which, due to their strong central governments
and centrally managed economies, are able to "turn on a dime,"
and make rapid regulatory, economic, and consumer behavior
changes. 2 6 Even in the context of initiatives emerging from the
UN Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen, 237 the divided
U.S. political process is unlikely to reach a consensus quickly
enough to pass legislation-or appropriate funding-necessary to
enable U.S. industry to keep pace with its competitors from other
countries and with new initiatives resulting from the Copenhagen
Conference. Lack of political consensus and concrete policies 238
will also impair the ability of the United States to take bold and
imaginative steps to quickly reduce its carbon footprint and di-
vorce itself from foreign oil. That lack of consensus will under-
mine the ability of the United States to be an advocate on the
world stage for responsible GHG reduction action because it is
perceived as weak, insincere, and uncommitted. 39 Political plural-
ism is a source of strength in many respects, but in this particu-
lar context it is a weakness because of the rapid pace of climate
change. Result: A Risk Factor.
236. See DIAMOND, supra note 11, at 374.
China's geographic core was unified already in 221 B.C. and has remained
unified for most of the time since then.... [tihat unity enabled China's rules
to command changes over a larger area than any European ruler could ever
command .... [tihe strengths and risks of China's unity have persisted into
recent times ....
Id. at 374.
237. Press Release, United Nations, Copenhagen United Nations Climate Change Con-
ference Ends with Political Agreement to Cap Temperature Rise, Reduce Emissions and
Raise Finance, (Dec. 19, 2009), available at http://unfccc.int/files/press/news-room/press.
releases and advisories/application/pdf/prcopl5_20091219.pdf. See generally Press Re-
lease, United Nations, "Opportunity to Avoid Catastrophic Climate Change is in Your
Hands," Secretary-General Tells World Leaders at Climate Summit, U.N. Doc. ENV/
DEV/1069 (Sept. 22, 2009).
238. PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE & PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, CLIMATE
CHANGE 101: STATE ACTION 1 (Jan. 2009), available at http://www.pewclimate.org/docUp
loads/climatelOl-State-JanO9.pdf.
239. See, e.g., Julianne Smith & Derek Mix, The Transatlantic Climate Change Chal-
lenge, 31 WASH. Q. 139, 139, 146 (2007-2008).
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One final point that is not included in Diamond's typology but
is, for the United States, critically important, should be ad-
dressed:
[T]he commonest circumstance under which societies fail to perceive
a problem is when it takes the form of a slow trend concealed by
wide up-and-down fluctuations. The prime example in modern times
is global warming. We now realize that temperatures around the
world have been slowly rising .... [yet] President Bush of the U.S. is
still not convinced of its reality, and he thinks we need more re-
search. The medieval Greenlanders had similar difficulties in recog-
nizing that their climate was gradually becoming colder24 and the
Maya and Anasazi had trouble discerning that theirs was becoming
drier.
Politicians use the term "creeping normalcy". . . . Such expe-
riences are a major reason why people may fail to notice a developing
problem, until it is too late.24'
VI. APPROACHES
Prior to embarking upon an examination of the specific policies
that the United States is pursuing domestically and internation-
ally to address the risks discussed above, it is useful to identify,
on a macro level, the general policies that the United States must
pursue in order to mitigate the risks identified thus far. Simply
stated, these macro policies require the United States to:
9 Reduce domestic and international dependence on imported
oil to minimize political, economic, and international national se-
curity risks;
o Reduce U.S. consumption of carbon fuels to slow the effects
of climate change and enable the United States to comply with in-
ternational obligations;
o Provide assistance, market incentives, and effective legal
structures to get newly emerging and developing countries to mi-
nimize their consumption of GHG consuming fuels and minimize
other activities, such as deforestation, which exacerbate climate
change; and
240. See DIAMOND, supra note 11, at 248. Norse Greenland's demise was due to exten-
sive deforestation. Id. This minimized their supply for fuel and shelter, coupled with over-
grazing and extreme erosion, all of which prevented sustainable farming. Id. at 248-54.
The extreme erosion resulted in the loss of most natural vegetation, making it impossible
to raise domesticated animals and causing the starvation of most wild animals. Id.
241. Id. at 425-26.
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: Develop and field new alternative energy technologies,
which increase worldwide access to cheap electrons.
A. The Policy Agenda for the United States and Developed
Countries
Friedman recognizes the impacts of the colliding forces of un-
checked population growth, state collapse, dependence on petro-
leum, and global warming.242 He urges that the United States and
other developed countries must enact market-based policies to
promote the worldwide availability of clean and cheap electrical
power. 243 Friedman's basic construct is that developed countries
should supply the technology to provide energy to less-developed
countries. 244 In exchange for that energy, developing countries will
restore lands that have been ravaged by overpopulation, poor en-
vironmental and agricultural practices, and provide the cheap la-
bor necessary to manufacture the technical solutions developed
by the United States.2 45 Because there is no global governance
system, it would be nearly impossible to establish a rules-based
approach that forces developed countries to discontinue their use
of oil or to transfer technology to developing countries for free.
Acknowledging that fact, Friedman suggests enacting policies
that will stimulate the international economic marketplace in
clean electrons. 246 While Friedman suggests that a market-based
versus rules-based approach is the best way to confront the issues
of global warming and clean electrification of the planet, the real-
ity is that government involvement is still necessary to counte-
ract the excesses and other externalities of the competitive mar-
ketplace, to ensure that all governments operate using the same
rulebook, and provide seed money for the poorest states that can't
pay.247
The eternal optimist, Friedman notes, "[Elnergy can not only
make a hotter world more tolerable and a flatter world more
equitable; it can also make a crowded world more comfortable. 2 48
242. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 11, at 5.
243. See id. at 217-18, 244.
244. See id. at 178.
245. See id. at 175-76.
246. See id. at 143-44, 252.
247. See id. at 244-45.
248. Id. at 166.
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Friedman advocates a concerted push by government and indus-
try to (1) develop energy-efficient and green technologies to ad-
dress the inherent economic and political problems of relying
upon imported oil, (2) reduce greenhouse gas emissions, (3) pre-
pare the United States for impending global policies which limit
carbon emissions, and (4) promote sustainable energy develop-
ment among first and third world countries. 249 Most interestingly,
Friedman suggests that the current economic crisis should signal
that "[g]reen is the way you grow," whereby substantial govern-
ment and private sector investments are made in green technolo-
gies for both domestic consumption and export markets and, pre-
sumably, to provide an industrial platform for the U.S. economy
and its recovery.2 °
Friedman argues that the current legal and political structure
stifles energy innovation.25' He notes that the total investment in
research and development by electric utilities in alternative ener-
gy sources in the United States was only about 0.15% in total
revenues, as contrasted with a typical industrial rate of research
and development of 8 to 10%.252 Friedman states that the last
clean energy breakthrough in the United States occurred in 1975,
"the days of filterless cigarettes and segregation."253 He further
argues that the Department of Energy ("DOE") funding for basic
energy research is insufficient to meet the challenges: "Seven
hundred research proposals for working on solar energy were
turned down for fiscal 2008" by DOE. 25 4 Because of a lack of pri-
vate sector incentives, premier technology providers like General
Electric ("GE") have seen only one generation of innovation in
clean energy development in the past twenty-six years.2 55 In con-
trast, GE "has seen 'eight or nine' generations of innovation in
medical technology . ,,256 Conversely, some European govern-
249. See id. at 171-78, 181-83, 185-87, 189, 191-95, 198-99.
250. See id. at 172.
251. Id. at 243-46, 252-58, 260.
252. Id. at 247.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 383. Friedman's view is that the "[g]overnment's job is to seed the [basic]
research that will produce the sorts of fundamental breakthroughs in chemistry, materials
science, biology, physics, and nanotechnology that open the way for whole new approaches
to solving energy problems. .. ." Id. at 382. But see infra notes 285-89 and accompanying
text (discussing DOE's recent Advanced Research Agency projects).
255. FRIEDMAN, supra note 11, at 247.
256. Id. Jeffrey Immelt, the Chairman and CEO of GE, reported that the company is
still selling the basic coal-fired plant it sold when he first joined the company twenty-six
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ments and Japan have had aggressive alternative energy incen-
tive programs in place since 1990.27
Friedman notes that electrified villages in rural India are now
used by Silicon Valley companies to complete remote data
processing.2 58 This encourages rural residents to remain in or re-
turn to their villages, rather than migrate to strained megacities
like Mumbai and Calcutta. 2 9 Electrification of the rural country-
side is the key to these particular success stories and is a trend
that must be repeated throughout the developing world, for the
current inhabitants of the countryside are those most likely to
pursue sustainable land use practices and preserve unique habi-
tats.20 Access to cheap electrons is the key, and the United States
is in an excellent position to develop and sell technologies that
will use fewer "'inputs' from forests, water, and land."261
In assessing the necessary steps now being taken to sustain a
revolution in clean energy and independence from imported oil, it
is next appropriate to review the approaches that have been tak-
en domestically and internationally, as well as some ideas-such
as those put forward by the Rocky Mountain Institute ("RMI")-
that are not part of the current menu of initiatives. 262 Hopefully,
in this process of critical review the gaps will become evident be-
tween the reality on the ground and Friedman's vision.
B. Legislative Approaches: Past and Future
1. International Efforts: The Kyoto and Copenhagen Agreements
It is beyond the scope of this paper to identify and critique
every legal approach that seeks to change the behavior of indi-
vidual and corporate citizens attempting to mitigate their depen-
dency on hydrocarbons and/or their GHG footprint. However,
since the Kyoto Protocol ("Kyoto" or "Protocol") entered into force
in 2005, many national governments have either enacted domes-
years ago, though "[t]hey're a little cleaner and more efficient now...." Id.
257. See id. at 388-89.
258. See id. at 166-67.
259. Id. at 167 (describing several workers who returned to their rural hometowns for a
richer and more tranquil life after working in such megacities).
260. Id. at 167-69.
261. Id. at 190-91.
262. See infra Part G.
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tic legislation that implements their specific national responsibil-
ities under Kyoto or indirectly addresses the issue. 263 Over 180
countries have ratified the Protocol; the most notable non-
member of the Protocol is the United States.264 Generally speak-
ing, Protocol parties commit themselves, in a politically binding
fashion, to a reduction of the four GHGs (carbon dioxide, me-
thane, nitrous oxide, sulphur hexafluoride) and two additional re-
sulting groups of gases (hydrofluorocarbons and perfluorocarbons)
so that the overall production levels of Annex I countries are 5.2%
less than their production levels in 1990.265
To achieve their GHG targets, national authorities have the
option to simply reduce their GHG emissions or to obtain carbon
credits from other countries through transfer (i.e., the Clean
Development Mechanism ("CDM")), or through the financing of
clean energy projects in non-Annex I countries. 266 Under the
Protocol, only Annex I countries have to meet the 5.2% reduction
limits. 267 A country that fails to meet its attainment goals has to
263. The Kyoto Protocol is a protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change, aimed at combating global warming. See Kyoto Protocol to the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec. 10, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 32 [hereinaf-
ter Kyoto Protocol]. The UNFCCC was an outgrowth of the United Nations Conference on
Environment and Development ("UNCED"), informally known as the Earth Summit, held
in Rio de Janeiro in June 1992. See Edith Brown Weiss, Introductory Note, United Nations
Conference on Environment and Development, June 3-14, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 814. The objec-
tive of the Kyoto Protocol is to stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere
at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate
system. Kyoto Protocol, supra, art. 2. The Protocol was negotiated in Kyoto, Japan in
December 1997, opened for signature on March 16, 1998, and closed on March 15, 1999.
See Brenda P. McGivern, Introductory Note, Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Frame-
work Convention on Climate Change, Dec. 10, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22. The agreement came
into force on February 16, 2005, following ratification by Russia on November 18, 2004. As
of November 6, 2009, a total of 189 countries and one regional economic organization, the
European Community ("EC"), have ratified the agreement, representing over 63.7% of
emissions from Annex I countries. See Kyoto Protocol, supra, art. 24; UNFCCC, Kyoto
Protocol Status of Ratification (2009), http://unfccc.int/files/kyoto-protocol/statusof_ratifi
cation/application/pdf/kp-ratification.pdf (listing countries that have ratified the Protocol).
264. See UNFCCC, Kyoto Protocol Status of Ratification, supra note 263. The United
States has signed but not ratified the Protocol. The U.S. Senate, however, unanimously
passed, by a 95-0 vote, the Byrd-Hagel Resolution. See Byrd-Hagel Resolution, S. Res. 98,
105th Cong. (1977) ("[Tlhe Senate strongly believes that the proposals under negotiation,
because of the disparity of treatment between Annex I Parties and Developing Countries
and the level of required emission reductions, could result in serious harm to the United
States economy....").
265. See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 263, art. 3, 37 I.L.M. at 33-34.
266. See id. arts. 5-6, 12, 37 I.L.M. at 35, 38.
267. See id., art. 3, 37 I.L.M. at 33-34. There are three categories of countries in the
Protocol: Annex I developed countries, Annex 2 developed countries that pay costs for de-
veloping countries, and developing countries. The United States and other highly devel-
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either make up the deficit or have its GHG trading rights
suspended.26
On February 14 and 15, 2007, delegates from Canada, France,
Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom, the United
States, Brazil, China, India, Mexico, and South Africa met in
Washington, D.C. and agreed to a non-binding statement that
essentially outlined a successor to the Protocol. 269 The delegates
discussed a cap-and-trade system that would apply to both
industrialized and developing countries, creating a global
market.270 The Copenhagen Conference 271 was expected to include
crediting systems for carbon sequestration and other
technologies, tropical forest preservation, technology transfer,
and biofuels. 272 Many preliminary meetings involving like-minded
countries-including newly industrialized countries-were held
to establish negotiating positions and to review negotiating
text, 273 although the actual Copenhagen COP 15 meetings in
December 2009 failed to produce a legally binding text.274 It is
oped countries (and the EC) are included in both Annex I and II. See UNFCCC, Kyoto Pro-
tocol Parties and Observers, http://unfccc.int/parties-and-observers/items/2704.php (last
visited Feb. 23, 2010).
268. See UNFCCC, An Introduction to the Kyoto Protocol Compliance Mechanism,
http://unfccc.int/kyoto-protocol/compliancelintroductionlitems/3024.pdf (last visited Feb.
23, 2010).
269. See INT'L COMM'N ON CLIMATE AND ENERGY SEC., GLOBE INT'L, WASHINGTON
LEGISLATORS' FORUM STATEMENT (2007), available at http://www.globeinternational.org
docs/content/washington-statement.pdf [hereinafter WASHINGTON STATEMENT]; GLOBE
International.org, Statement of the Globe Washington Legislators Forum, http://www.
globeinternational.org/content.php?id=2:8:0:237:0 (last visited Feb. 23, 2010); World Bank,
G8 Climate Change Dialogue Moves to Washington, http://web.worldbank.orgWBSITE/
EXTERNAIJNEWS/0,,contentMDK:21220244-menuPK:51062075pagePK.*34370-piPK:
34424-theSitePK.4607,00.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2010).
270. WASHINGTON STATEMENT, supra note 269.
271. The United Nations Climate Change Conference took place in Copenhagen, Den-
mark between December 7 and December 18, 2009. UNITED NATIONS CLIMATE CHANGE
CONFERENCE, OVERVIEW OF SCHEDULE 1 (2009), available at http://unfcc.int/fileslmeet
ings/ cop_15applicationpdf/overviewschedulecopl5.pdf. The conference included the
Fifteenth Session of the Conference of the Parties ("COP 15"), the overarching UNFCCC,
and the fifth meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol ("CMP5"). Id. at 1, 5.
272. See UNFCCC, Draft Implementing Agreement Under the Convention Prepared by
the Government of the United States of America for Adoption at the Fifteenth Session of
the Conference of the Parties 7, 9, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2009/7 (June 6, 2009), available at
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/copl5/eng/07.pdf [hereinafter Draft Implementing
Agreement].
273. See, e.g., supra note 269 and accompanying text.
274. The Conference did produce a "Copenhagen Accord" in which the states all ac-
knowledged the existence of climate change and required states to continue their volunta-
ry reductions, make reports on their progress, and pledge new measures, pending the im-
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impossible, however, to predict what will be in the treaty and
whether newly industrialized countries, like China and India,
will be required to assume binding commitments to reduce
greenhouse gases and, in the case of China, help pay the costs of
developing countries. It is also uncertain whether developing
countries will assume legally binding obligations to limit their
GHG emissions and stop their destruction of tropical forests, or
adopt prudent agricultural and other control measures which
help to mitigate GHG emissions. 27 5
However, the wide participation of states in the Copenhagen
process, combined with the announcement of voluntary targets by
China and India, indicates that there is still some international
momentum to secure a legally binding accord even though the
progress will take much longer than is desirable.276 Obviously, if
there is a total collapse of the ongoing climate talks, it is not
beyond the realm of possibility for states that feel most
threatened by climate change to take unilateral measures,
including trade sanctions against states perceived to not be
serious in achieving reductions.
C. Current Domestic Programs to Promote Energy Efficiency and
Reduce GHG
The Energy Policy Act of 2005277 is an exception to the United
States' otherwise lackluster performance in the past decade to in-
centivize private industry to invest in alternative energy sys-
tems.2 8 The Act extended small tax credits to individuals and
position of mandatory measures via a binding international agreement. UN Climate
Change Conference, Dec. 7-18, 2009, Copenhagen Accord, 1 1-2, 4-5, Decision -/CP.15,
available at http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/cop-15/application/pdf/copl5-cph-auv.pdf.
275. See Richard Black, Climate Talks a Tricky Business, BBC NEwS, Nov. 18, 2006,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/6161998.stm.
276. See John M. Broder, Countries Submit Emission Goals, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2010,
at A10.
277. Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the
U.S.C.).
278. In 2004, the Bush administration signaled that there might be a connection be-
tween human activity and climate change. See CLIMATE CHANGE SCI. PROGRAM &
SUBCOMM. ON GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH, OUR CHANGING PLANET: THE U.S. CLIMATE
CHANGE SCIENCE PROGRAM FOR FISCAL YEARS 2004 AND 2005, at 47 (2004), available at
http:www.usgcrp.gov/usgcrpLibrary/cp2004-5/ocp2004-5.pdf ("[O]bservations and model
simulations shows that North America temperature changes from 1950 to 1999 were un-
likely to be due only to natural climate variations."). However, John H. Marburger, the
President's science adviser, stated that the report did not implicate policy. Juliet Eilperin,
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businesses that installed solar electrical generation systems.279
The Act also extended credits to building owners that incorpo-
rated "green" lighting and heating, ventilating, and air condition-
ing ("HVAC") standards and extended loan guarantees to those
businesses that converted to innovative technologies.20 However,
the legislation has been criticized for extending tax benefits to oil
companies that drill in the Gulf of Mexico and for rejecting in-
creased vehicle efficiency standards.281 In a parallel effort, DOD
funded a wide variety of initiatives to make use of renewable
energy sources for its bases and military platforms,282 including
developing new types of fuels, re-engineering combat systems for
better fuel economy, expanding use of hybrid combat vehicles 283
and geothermal generation systems, and testing prototypical
"smart micro grid" technology at some of its bases.284
The establishment of the DOE's Advanced Research Project
Agency ("ARPA-E") in 2007 is another promising development.285
Administration Shifts on Global Warming, WASH. POST., Aug. 27, 2004, at A19. The Bush
administration shifted course in June 2008 when the U.S. Climate Change Science Pro-
gram issued a report noting that droughts, heavy rain, heat waves, wildfires, and intense
hurricanes are more likely to affect North America because of global warming's effect. U.S.
CLIMATE CHANGE SCI. PROGRAM, WEATHER AND CLIMATE EXTREMES IN A CHANGING
CLIMATE vii (Thomas R. Karl et al. eds., 2008), available at http://www.downloads.climate
science.gov/sap/sap3-3/sap3-3-final-all.pdf.
279. The Energy Policy Act of 2005 was reauthorized by the Emergency Economic Sta-
bilization Act of 2008. Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765 (codified as amended in scat-
tered sections of the U.S.C.). The Energy Policy Act included tax credits to homeowners for
"Qualified Energy Efficiency Improvements," including storm windows, more efficient
HVAC systems, and solar and fuel cell systems, and permanent credits (beginning in
2006) for those purchasing hybrid gas-electric automobiles. Energy Policy Act §§ 1333(a),
1341(a), (c), 26 U.S.C. §§ 25C, 30B.
280. Id. §§ 132, 1701, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6309, 16511; id. § 1333(a), 26 U.S.C. § 25C.
281. See, e.g., Michael Grunwald & Juliet Eilperin, Energy Bill Raises Fears About Pol-
lution, Fraud; Critics Point to Perks for Industry, WASH. POST, July 30, 2005, at Al; see
also infra note 298 (describing similar criticisms of the 2009 Cash for Clunkers Program).
282. See CNA CORP., supra note 5, at 33-34; see also Tim Kauffman, Getting to "Net-
Zero"Energy Use, FED. TIMES, Aug. 17, 2009, at 1.
283. See CNA CORP., supra note 5, at 33-39.
284. See William Matthews, Maine Base Sees Savings on "Smart Microgrid," FED.
TIMES, Aug. 10, 2009, at 16.
285. ARPA-E was originally established under the America Competes Act of 2007.
America Competes Act § 5012, 42 U.S.C. § 16538 (Supp. I. 2009). ARPA-E appears to be
modeled after the ARPA model found in a number of other federal agencies, including the
Department of Defense ("DARPA"), the Department of Homeland Security ("HSARPA")
and Health and Human Services ("H-ARPA"). See U.S. Dep't of Energy, Transformational
Energy Research Projects Win $151 Million in Funding (Oct. 26, 2009), http://arpa-
e.energy.gov (last visited Feb. 23, 2010). In April 2009 President Obama announced $400
million in initial funding for ARPA-E through the American Recovery and Reinvestment
Act, $151 million of which was allocated to alternative energy programs. Id.
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On October 26, 2009, the DOE announced major funding for thir-
ty-seven ambitious research projects-including projects that ex-
plore the use of intermittent energy sources, like wind and solar,
to provide a steady flow of power, use of new battery technology
for automobiles, use of bacteria to produce automotive fuel from
sunlight, and use of enzymes to capture carbon dioxide.286 Estab-
lished in 2007, the ARPA-E aimed to financially stimulate the
process of "identifying and promoting revolutionary advances in
fundamental science ... and... accelerating transformational
technological advances in areas that industry by itself is not like-
ly to undertake because of technical and financial uncertainty."287
The ARPA-E can achieve this goal by using contracts, grants, and
"other transaction" authority, which empowers DOE to enter into
research and development programs with contractors to tackle is-
sues of great importance to the nation. 88 The impressive array of
diverse research programs for 2009 with non-traditional research
organizations (e.g., Delphi Automotive Systems LLC, E.I. du Pont
de Nemours and Company, General Motors Company, Nalco
Company, United Technologies Research Center)289 shows that
the government is looking beyond academia and its usual re-
search providers-national laboratories and federally funded re-
search and development centers-to search for alternative energy
solutions.
The Great Recession of 2008-2010 may, go down in history as
groundbreaking in terms of United States' political acceptance of
the need to seriously pursue energy independence. The $787 bil-
lion stimulus legislation in 2009, ARRA,29 ° has some noteworthy
provisions to incentivize businesses. ARRA gave businesses up to
a 30% tax credit for investment in "qualifying advanced energy
project[s]" defined as those that "re-equip[ ], expand[ ], or estab-
lish[ I a manufacturing facility for the production of' renewable or
clean energy.291 A $2.3 billion overall cap was established on the
286. Id.
287. America Competes Act § 5012, (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 16538(c)(2) (Supp. 1 2009)).
288. See 42 U.S.C. § 7256 (2006); U.S. Dep't of Energy, Training Curriculum for Tech-
nology Investment Agreements (TIAs), http://management.energy.gov/policy-guidance/14
12.htm (last visited Feb. 23, 2010).
289. See U.S. Dep't of Energy, supra note 285.
290. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 was the economic stimulus
package enacted by the 111th Congress and signed into law on February 17, 2009. Pub. L.
No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115 (to be codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
291. Id. § 1302, 123 Stat. at 345 (to be codified at 26 U.S.C. § 48C).
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program,2 92 which appeared to be the first time that public funds
have been used to fund alternative energy improvements by pub-
lic utilities, plants, or factories that have on-site energy genera-
tion plants.2 93 ARRA also allows taxpayers eligible for the federal
renewable electricity production tax credit to take the federal
business energy investment tax credit or to receive a grant from
the U.S. Treasury Department for new installations.294 Finally,
over $20 billion was appropriated to DOE to research and develop
a smart electricity grid and advanced batteries as well as to
guarantee loans for renewable energy projects. 295
The enormously popular "Cash for Clunkers" legislation was
also beneficial.296 It provided some needed stimulus for the auto-
mobile industry, while at the same time reducing GHG emissions
by removing automobiles, which consumed an excessive amount
of fuel and emitted commensurately greater amounts of GHGs,
from U.S. roads.297 Even though legitimate criticisms were leveled
at the Cash for Clunkers program for failing to be sufficiently ag-
gressive in increasing the fuel economy standards for replace-
ment vehicles,298 the program has made a positive contribution to
292. U.S. Dep't of Energy, Treasury, Energy Announce More Than $2 Billion in Recov-
ery Act Tax Credits for Energy Manufacturers (Aug. 13, 2009), http://www.energy.gov/
news2009/7801.htm.
293. Tom Konrad, AltEnergy Stocks, What the ARRA Means for Clean Energy: One
State's Example, http://www.altenergystocks.com/archives/2009/03/what the arrameans_
for cleanenergy-onestatesexample.htm (last visited Feb. 23, 2010).
294. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act § 1102, 123 Stat. 115, 319-20 (to be co-
dified at 26 U.S.C. § 48).
295. Id. tit. IV, 123 Stat. at 138-40; see supra note 285 (discussing the research to be
undertaken by the ARPA-E).
296. The "Consumer Assistance to Recycle and Save Program" was established in the
Supplemental Appropriations Act of 2009. Pub. L. No. 111-32, §§ 1301-1302, 123 Stat.
1859, 1909-15. Because of the program's popularity, Congress authorized an additional $2
billion in funding for the program in a subsequent supplemental appropriations bill. Pub.
L. No. 111-47, 123 Stat. 1972 (2009).
297. See Supplemental Appropriations Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-32, §§ 1301-1302,
123 Stat. 1859, 1909-15.
298. Christopher Joyce, Critics Say 'Clunkers' Program Isn't Very Green, NAT'L PUB.
RADIO, Aug. 3, 2009, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=1115131; Post-
ing of Jesse Prentice-Dunn to Sierra Club, Looking Under the "Cash for Clunkers" Hood,
http://connect.sierraclub.org/post/ClimateCrossroadsBlog/looking-under the-cash_forclu
nkershood.html (Aug. 27, 2009, 11:14 PST). One might argue that the Cash for Clunkers
program is the type of painless legislation that is needed to progressively address GHG
emissions. However, despite its popularity, the resulting legislation only required that re-
placement vehicles achieve a two-mile-per-gallon increase in fuel efficiency. See Supple-
mental Appropriations Act § 1302, 123 Stat. at 1909-10. Senator John McCain called this
watering down of the original bill, which required a differential increase in fuel economy of
not less than 25% "lemon legislation" because it failed to achieve marked environmental
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overall efforts to reduce the United States' dependence on im-
ported oil and reduce the United States' carbon footprint.9 9 This
one-time program, however, is hardly the type of comprehensive
approach that the United States must take, domestically and in-
ternationally, to squarely address climate change and hydrocar-
bon dependency issues.
D. Other Tax Incentives to Promote Investment and Research and
Development in Alternative Energy
1. Research and Experimentation
The research and experimentation ("R&E") tax credit allows
companies to invest a portion of their resources in the research,
development, and testing of various products and services. 0 The
credit, which has expired and been extended many times since its
inception,s0' was extended by Congress in the Emergency Econom-
ic Stabilization Act of 2008.302 The Act included a retroactive two-
year extension of the R&E tax credit from December 31, 2007,
through December 31, 2009, and increased the Alternative Sim-
plified Credit rate to 14% for 2009.303
savings, especially given the large taxpayer investment. 155 Cong. Rec. 56844 (daily ed.
June 19, 2009) (statement of Sen. McCain). McCain also referenced a statement by Sena-
tors Feinstein and Collins: "It's amazing how quickly a good idea can go bad in Washing-
ton... Our 'Cash for Clunkers' proposal was a win-win for the environment and the econ-
omy. Then Detroit auto industry lobbyists got involved. Soon a rival bill emerged . . .
tailored perfectly to the auto industry's specifications." Id. (quoting Dianne Feinstein &
Susan Collins, Handouts for Hummers, WALL ST. J., June 11, 2009, at A13).
299. Official Blog of the U.S. Secretary of Transportation, Cash for Clunkers Ends a
Successful Run, http://fastlane.dot.gov/2009/08/cash-for-clunkers-ends-a-successful-run.
html (Aug. 26, 2009, 14:24 EST).
300. The basic authority for the credit is section 41(b)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code,
which allows businesses to claim a credit for "qualified research expenses," the sum of in-
house and contract research expenses associated with the actual conduct of qualified re-
search, as in the case of a scientist conducting laboratory experiments. I.R.C. § 41(b)(1)
(2006); Treas. Reg. § 1.41-2(c)(1) (2009).
301. See 26 U.S.C. § 41(h) (2006) (amending effective date six times since 1983).
302. Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
the U.S.C.). The Act is commonly referred to as the "bailout" of the U.S. financial system.
See, e.g., David Cho, Bailout Program Could Be Extended, WASH. POST, Nov. 19, 2009, at
A18.
303. See Tax Extenders and Alternative Minimum Tax Relief Act of 2008, Pub. L. No.
110-343, §§ 301(a), (c), 122 Stat. 3861, 3865-66 (to be codified at 26 U.S.C. §§ 41(c)(5)(A),
(h)(1)(11)).
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The current R&E credit has been criticized as fickle-one never
knows whether expiring legislation will be re-extended-and in-
adequate to compete with the policies of other countries, like
Canada, which actively compete for U.S. R&E dollars by offering
generous R&E credits to U.S. multinational corporations that
have a presence in their country and do research there. ° The
current iteration of the R&E credit expired on December 31,
2009, 3°5 prompting calls for the credit to be made permanent and
for the alternative simplified credit to be increased from 14% to
20% to establish rough equivalence-not dominance-with the
credits of other U.S. trading partners.30 6 Permanent extension of
the credit would also help to create positive incentives for compa-
nies to make long-term investments in basic research related to
energy efficiency and alternative energy systems.3 0 7
2. Investment Credits
The federal business energy investment tax credit first made
available under the Energy Policy Act of 2005308 was recently ex-
panded by the Energy Improvement and Extension Act of 2008.309
This law extended the existing credits in the Internal Revenue
Code 310 by eight years, for "advanced energy projects" including
solar energy, 311 fuel cells, 311 and micro-turbines. 3 It also estab-
304. Telephone Interview with Philip Beram, Chief Tax Counsel, U.S. Chamber of
Commerce (Oct. 5, 2009); see also ROBERT D. ATKINSON, THE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY
AND INNOVATION FOUNDATION, THE RESEARCH AND EXPERIMENTATION TAX CREDIT: A
CRITICAL POLICY TOOL FOR BOOSTING RESEARCH AND ENHANCING U.S. ECONOMIC
COMPETITIVENESS 5 (Sept. 4, 2006), available at http://www.itif.org/files/R&DTaxCredit.
pdf.
305. Tax Extenders and Alternative Minimum Tax Relief Act § 301(a)(1), 122 Stat. at
3865 (to be codified at 26 U.S.C. § 41(h)(1)(B)).
306. See R&D Credit Coalition, http://www.investinamericasfuture.org (last visited
Feb. 23, 2010).
307. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 11, at 379-80 (discussing the lack of stable investment
tax credits for those investing in wind and solar technologies in contrast to the traditional
support given in the tax code to the oil and gas industries in the form of depletion tax cre-
dits). Friedman's point, however, is equally true with regard to the very expensive costs of
nuclear plant construction, the conversion coal and oil-fired industries, and utilities and
transportation systems that incorporate the best technologies in terms of carbon capture.
See id.
308. Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the
U.S.C.).
309. Pub. L. No. 110-343, div. B, 122 Stat. 3765, 3807 (to be codified in scattered sec-
tions of 26 U.S.C.).
310. See 26 U.S.C. § 48 (2006 & Supp. 1 2009).
311. Energy Improvement and Extension Act § 103(a)(1), 122 Stat. at 3811 (to be codi-
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lished new credits for small wind-energy systems,314 geothermal
heat pumps, 315 and combined heat and power ("CHP") systems.3 16
fled at 26 U.S.C. §§ 48(a)(2)(A)(i)(II), (ii)). The credit is equal to 30% of expenditures, with
no maximum credit. See 26 U.S.C. § 48(a)(2)(A) (2006). Eligible solar energy property in-
cludes equipment that "uses solar energy to generate electricity, to heat or cool (or provide
hot water for use in) a structure, or to provide solar process heat . . . ." Id. at § 48(a)(3)(i).
Hybrid solar lighting systems, "which use[ ] solar energy to illuminate the inside of a
structure using fiber-optic distributed sunlight" are eligible. Id. § 48(a)(3)(A)(ii). Passive
solar systems and solar pool-heating systems are not eligible. Id. § 48(a)(3)(A)(i). The Solar
Energy Industries Association has published a four-page document that provides answers
to frequently asked questions regarding the federal tax credits for solar energy. See SOLAR
ENERGY INDUS. ASS'N, THE SOLAR INVESTMENT TAX CREDITS FREQUENTLY ASKED
QUESTIONS, http://seia.org/galleries/pdf/ITC-Frequently-AskedQuestions-10-9-8.pdf
(last visited Feb. 23, 2010).
312. Energy Improvement and Extension Act § 103(a)(2), 122 Stat. at 3811 (to be codi-
fied at 26 U.S.C. § 48(c)(1)(E)). The credit is equal to 30% of expenditures, with no maxi-
mum credit. See 26 U.S.C. § 48(a)(20)(A). However, the credit for fuel cells is capped at
$1500 per 0.5 kilowatts ("kW") of capacity. § 103(d), 122 Stat. at 3813 (to be codified at 26
U.S.C. § 48(c)(1)(B)). Eligible property includes fuel cells with a minimum capacity of 0.5
kW that have an electricity-only generation efficiency of 30% or higher. 26 U.S.C. §
48(c)(1)(A). The credit for property placed in service before October 3, 2008, is capped at
$500 per 0.5 kW. Id. § 48(c)(1)(B) (2006 & Supp. 1 2009).
313. Energy Improvement and Extension Act § 103(a)(3), 122 Stat. at 3811 (to be codi-
fied at 28 U.S.C. § 48(c)(2)(E)). The credit is equal to 10% of expenditures, with no maxi-
mum credit limit explicitly stated. See 26 U.S.C. § 48(a)(2)(A)(ii) (2006). The credit for mi-
croturbines is capped at $200 per kW of capacity. Id. § 48(c)(2)(B) (2006 & Supp. I 2009).
Eligible property includes microturbines up to two megawatts ("MW") in capacity that
have an electricity-only generation efficiency of 26% or higher. Id. § 48(c)(2)(A) (2006).
314. Energy Improvement and Extension Act § 104, 122 Stat. at 3813 (to be codified at
26 U.S.C. § 48(a)). The credit is equal to 30% of expenditures, with no maximum credit for
small wind turbines placed in service after December 31, 2008. Id. § 104(b), 122 Stat. at
3814 (to be codified at 26 U.S.C. § 48(a)(2)(A)(i)(iv)). Eligible small wind property includes
wind turbines up to 100 kW in capacity. Id. § 104(c), 122 Stat. at 3814 (to be codified at 26
U.S.C. § 48(c)(A)(C)). In general, the maximum credit is $4000 for eligible property placed
in service after October 3, 2008, and before January 1, 2009. Id. (to be codified at 26 U.S.C.
§ 48(c)(4)(B)). The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 removed the $4,000
maximum credit limit for small wind turbines. See Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 1103, 123 Stat.
115.
315. Energy Improvement and Extension Act § 105, 122 Stat. at 3814 (to be codified at
26 U.S.C. § 48(a)(3)(vii)). The credit is equal to 30% of expenditures, with no maximum
credit limit stated. Id. § 106(d), 122 Stat. at 3815; see 26 U.S.C. § 48(a)(2)(A)(ii). Eligible
geothermal energy property includes geothermal heat pumps and equipment for produc-
ing, distributing or using energy derived from a geothermal deposit. Id. 122 Stat. at 3816
(to be codified at 26 U.S.C. § 25D(d)(5)). For electricity produced by geothermal power,
equipment qualifies only up to, but not including, the electric transmission stage. Id. §
109(a)(2), 122 Stat. at 3821 (to be codified at 26 U.S.C. § 451(i)(6)). For geothermal heat
pumps, this credit applies to eligible property placed in service after Oct. 3, 2008. Id. §
105(b), 122 Stat. at 3814 (to be codified at 26 U.S.C. § 48).
316. Id. § 103(c), 122 Stat. at 3811 (to be codified at 26 U.S.C. §§ 48(a), (c)). The credit
is equal to 10% of expenditures, with no maximum limit stated. See 26 U.S.C. §
48(a)(2)(A)(ii). Eligible CHP property generally includes systems up to 50 MW in capacity
that exceed 60% energy efficiency, subject to certain limitations and reductions for large
systems. Energy Improvement and Extension Act § 103(c), 122 Stat. at 3811-13 (to be co-
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The 2008 Act allowed taxpayers to take the credit against the al-
ternative minimum tax ("AMT"),3 1 7 although some credits were
phased out for those upper middle-class taxpayers who had the
means to purchase some of these exotic new systems. 31 In gener-
al, these credits are available for systems placed in service on or
before December 31, 2016. 319 Some of these credits were expanded
by ARRA, commonly known as the "stimulus legislation."320
E. The Pending "Cap-and-Trade" Legislation321
Various cap-and-trade bills have been introduced in both hous-
es of Congress; however, enactment of legislation remains an elu-
sive goal of the Obama administration for the foreseeable future.
dified at 26 U.S.C. § 48(c)). The efficiency requirement does not apply to CHP systems that
use biomass for at least 90% of the system's energy source, but the credit may be reduced
for less-efficient systems. Id. This credit applies to eligible property placed in service after
October 3, 2008. Id. § 103(f), 122 Stat. at 3813 (to be codified at 26 U.S.C. § 48).
317. Tax Extenders and Alternative Minimum Tax Relief Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-
343, § 102, 122 Stat. 3861, 3863 (to be codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
318. See Bob McTeer, Ph.D., Hearing on Fair and Equitable Tax Policy, The Alternative
Minimum Tax Threatens Middle-Income Families: A Fair and Equitable Tax Policy Would
Solve the Problem 1 (Sept. 6, 2007) (statement of Bob McTeer), available at http://www.
ncpa.orglspeechlthe-alternative-minimum-tax-threatens-middle-income-famiies-a-fair-
and-equitable-tax-policy-would-solve-the-problem.
319. Energy Improvement and Extension Act § 103(c)(2)(B), 122 Stat. at 3812 (to be
codified at 26 U.S.C. § 48(c)(3)(A)(iv)); see also Energy Star, Federal Tax Credits for Ener-
gy Efficiency, http://www.energystar.gov/taxcredits (last visited Feb. 23, 2010). The origi-
nal use of the equipment must begin with the taxpayer, or the system must be constructed
by the taxpayer. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Federal Incentives for Developing Combined
Heat and Power Projects, Tax Provisions, http://www.epa.gov/CHP/incentives/ index.html
(last visited Feb. 23, 2010). The equipment must also meet any performance and quality
standards in effect at the time the equipment is acquired. See Energy Improvement and
Extension Act § 106(d)(3)(B)(ii), 122 Stat. at 3816. The energy property must be operation-
al in the year in which the credit is first taken. See id. § 103(c)(2)(B), 122 Stat. at 3812 (to
be codified at 26 U.S.C. § 48(c)(3)(B)(i)).
320. Pub. L. No. 111-5, div. B, pt. I, 122 Stat. 115 (to be codified in scattered sections of
26 U.S.C.) That legislation created a credit for "plug in" vehicles, included AMT relief for
the credits available to purchasers of hybrid vehicles, and reauthorized homeowner tax
credits for the purchase of energy efficient heat pumps, water heaters, and wood stoves.
Id. §§ 1121, 1141, 122 Stat. at 323, 326 (to be codified at 26 U.S.C. §§ 25D, 30B, 30D).
321. Clean Energy Jobs and American Power Act, S. 1733, 111th Cong. (as reported by
S. Comm. on Envtl. and Pub. Works, Nov. 5, 2009). According to the Environmental Pro-
tection Agency ("EPA"), a "cap and trade system" is a "policy approach for controlling large
amounts of emissions from a group of sources." A limit, or cap, is placed on the amount of
emissions; companies are then given "emission allowances," the total of which must not
exceed the cap. These allowances can be traded among companies so long as the overall
emissions cap is not exceeded, thereby giving companies flexibility in a compliance strate-
gy. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Cap and Trade Essentials, http://www.epa.gov/captrade/doc
uments/ctessentials.pdf (last visited Feb. 23, 2010).
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The most advanced legislative effort-and a harbinger of the
shape of future legislation-is the American Clean Energy and
Security Act of 2009 ("ACES Act"), which was passed by the U.S.
House of Representatives on June 26 by a vote of 219 to 212.322
This legislation establishes an economy-wide, greenhouse gas
cap-and-trade system to help address climate change and enable
the United States to act as a functioning member of the Kyoto
Protocol's treaty organizations and, according to the EPA's analy-
sis, meet the current Protocol targets if certain "offset" assump-
tions hold true.3 23 Committee Chairman Henry Waxman and Rep-
resentative Edward Markey are sponsors of the legislation, 324
which will be presented to the Senate325 and possibly reconciled
with Senate Bill 1462,326 which contains similar cap-and-trade
provisions. In pertinent part, the bill mandates that electric
utilities-through the regulatory authority of the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission-increase their use of renewable energy
sources to satisfy retail energy users from 6.0% in 2012 to 20% in
2020 and the out-years.32 8 The legislation also establishes a State
Energy and Environmental Development system where states
can receive transfer payments from the federal government for
the realization of energy savings by adopting national energy effi-
ciency codes for commercial and residential real estate.3 29 Finally,
322. Final Vote Results for Roll Call 477 (June 26, 2009), http://clerk.house.gov/
evs/2009/ro11477.xml.
323. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, EPA Analysis of the American Clean Energy and Securi-
ty Act of 2009 H.R. 2454 in the 111th Congress 2, 45 (June 23, 2009), http:/www.
epa.gov/climatechange/economics/pdfs/HR2454_Analysis.pdf.
324. See ACES Act, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. (2009).
325. Clean Energy Jobs and American Power Act, S. 1733, 111th Cong. (2009).
326. American Clean Energy Leadership Act of 2009, S. 1462, 111th Cong. (as reported
by S. Comm. on Energy and Natural Res., July 11, 2009). Senator Mary Landrieu (Demo-
crat from Louisiana) and at least a half dozen Senate Democrats have withdrawn their
support for the current bill because of election year politics and higher legislative priori-
ties involving health care and the conomy. See Lisa Lerer, Senate Democrats to W.H.: Drop
Cap and Trade, POLITICO, Dec. 27, 2009, http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1209/309
84.html.
327. For an excellent analysis of the bill, see Pew Center Summary of H.R. 2454: Amer-
ican Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/
Waxman-Markey%20summaryFINAL_7.31.pdf (last visited Feb. 23, 2010).
328. H.R. 2454, § 610(d)(2). Renewable energy sources include wind, solar, geothermal,
renewable biomass, biograss or biofuels; qualified hydropower, marine and hydrokinetic
landfill gas and coal mine methane generation coupled with carbon capture. Id. §
610(a)(17). Current hydropower plant improvements and new nuclear power plants are
not given a credit against current carbon generating activity but are excluded from a utili-
ty's current activity. See id. § 610(a)(12), (19).
329. See H.R. 2454 § 131.
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the bill establishes a loan program for clean energy projects;3 0 na-
tional standards and incentive payments to facilitate the re-
placement of outdoor lighting, stoves, and appliances; 331 rebates
for the purchases of electric vehicles; 312 and incentives on govern-
ment-backed mortgages for energy efficient homes.33
Title VII of the bill contains nationwide emission reduction
goals-benchmarked against overall GHG emissions in 2005-for
all stationary sources of GHG emissions. 334 Overall federal GHG
limits are established in law, and reporting entities have to re-
duce their GHG emissions over time to comply with the federal
GHG reduction schedule.315 Entities that cannot meet federal
GHG limits must satisfy their compliance obligations either by
using "offset credits ,' 336 which will be on deposit with a registry
that is run by the EPA Administrator,3 37 or forfeiting credits in
the following years. 33 Credits are also available to emitters that
fund international reforestation activities.3 39 The legislation ac-
A State shall be considered to achieve compliance with a code described in
paragraph (2)(A) [of the statute] if at least 90 percent of new and substantial-
ly renovated building space in that State in the preceding year upon inspec-
tion meets the requirements of the code. A certification under paragraph (2)
shall include documentation of the rate of compliance based on-
(A) independent inspections of a random sample of the new and substantially
renovated buildings covered by the code in the preceding year; or
(B) an alternative method that yields an accurate measure of compliance as
determined by the Secretary.
Id. § 201(e)(3)).
330. Id. § 187.
331. Id. §§ 211, 212, 218.
332. Id. § 121.
333. Id. § 294.
334. Id. § 702. Entities that emit greater than 10,000 tons of CO2 per year have to an-
nually report their emissions. This includes fleets of vehicles which emit greater than
25,000 tons. See id. § 713(a)(2).
335. See id. § 764.
336. See H.R. 2454 § 722(d)(1)(A) (granting public entities the ability to use offset cre-
dits to demonstrate compliance for up to a maximum of two billion tons of GHG emissions
annually). Entities can purchase offset credits from other emitting entities or can obtain
offset credits as a result of reduced international reforestation activity. See id. § 724(a)
(giving holders of offset credits the ability to sell, exchange, or transfer them with other
offset holders); id. § 743(e)(1) (granting the Administrator the authority to issue interna-
tional offset credits for GHG emission reductions achieved through activities that reduce
deforestation).
337. See id. § 732(d).
338. See id. § 723(c).
339. See id. § 743(e).
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knowledges the importance of international negotiations to pre-
vent "carbon leakage" in specified markets and to prevent com-
petitive imbalances. m4
F. Other Good Ideas
In 2004, DOD funded the non-profit RMI to devise a strategy
"for getting the United States completely, attractively and profit-
ably off oil."341 The engineers and scientists at RMI proposed a va-
riety of novel public policies to accelerate the process of restruc-
turing the oil economy 42 One such proposal was a decade-long
investment of $180 billion in various industries and programs,
which RMI projects will be paid for many times over by the crea-
tion of new jobs associated with converting oil-based industry and
transportation systems to systems that rely upon alternative
energy sources.3 43 Some of the specific suggestions include:
9 Vehicle Standards: The Great Recession of 2008-2010 has
wrought substantial restructuring of the U.S. auto industry,
which has increased its focus on fuel economy. The RMI stated
that the United States had an "endangered automotive sector"
with a history of "[rieliance on lawyers and lobbyists ... to avert
competition and regulation [that] ... long restrained American
automakers from fully exploiting their extraordinary engineering
prowess."144 In particular, RMI noted that "GM lobbyists killed
California's Zero-Emission Vehicle rule, which had given a head
start" in the development of a battery-electric hybrid,345 arguably
because of concerns about the industry's future, the loss of con-
sumer choice, and potential safety risks for drivers.346 Of course,
340. See id. § 766.
341. AMORY B. LOVINS ET AL., ROCKY MOUNTAIN INSTITUTE, WINNING THE OIL
ENDGAME vii, 278 (2005).
342. Id. at vii.
343. Id.
344. Id. at 130.
345. Id. at 130 n.571 (noting that after GM lobbyists "killed" the zero emissions rule "a
2001 anti-CAFE standards lobbying blitz strove to convince Americans that efficient cars
[were] unsafe and unaffordable"). "CAFE" refers to the sales-weighted average fuel econo-
my of a manufacturer's fleet of passenger cars and light trucks, manufactured for sale in
the United States. Nat'l Highway Traffic & Safety Admin., CAFE Overview, http/www.
nhtsa.dot.gov/CARS/rules/CAFE/overview.htm (last visited Feb. 23, 2010).
346. See RICHARD BYRNE, LIFE IN THE SLOW LANE: TRACKING DECADES OF AUTOMAKER
ROADBLOCKS TO FUEL ECONOMY 1 (2003). It is also possible that lobbyists simply did not
want to demonstrate compliance with CAFE standards.
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the net result was that Toyota and Honda took the lead in hybr-
ids.47 To reverse the trend permanently, RMI suggested that the
United States should eliminate two effective subsidies of the au-
tomobile industry: excessively low taxes on fuels-as compared
with the rest of the developed world4-and fuel efficiency stan-
dards that reward inefficiency and encourage U.S. automakers to
under-compete u9 In the current environment, increased Corpo-
rate Average Fuel Economy ("CAFE") standards will have some
beneficial impacts on a global scale, since world auto manufactur-
ers will want to be able to access the lucrative U.S. market. High-
er CAFE standards350 will also serve as a forcing function which
drives efficiencies in overseas markets. On May 19, 2009, Presi-
dent Obama announced that the United States would establish
more aggressive fuel efficiency standards to take effect in 2016.351
The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration ("NHTSA")
and EPA issued a joint notice of proposed rulemaking on Septem-
ber 28, 2009. 312
347. See LOVINS ETAL., supra note 341, at 131.
348. See id. at 173-74.
349. See id. at 175.
350. On December 19, 2007, President George W. Bush signed into law the Energy In-
dependence and Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-140, 121 Stat. 1492, (codified in
scattered sections of the U.S.C.). President's Remarks on Signing the Energy Indepen-
dence and Security Act of 2007, 43 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1612 (Dec. 19, 2007). This
Act aimed to improve vehicle fuel economy and other conservation goals. See John M.
Broder, Bush Signs Broad Energy Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2007, http://www.nytimes.
com/2007/12/19/washington/l9cnd-energy.html. This was the first overhaul in standards
in over thirty years. Id. The Act set a goal for the national fuel economy standard of 35
miles per gallon by 2020. See Energy Independence and Security Act § 102(b)(2)(A), 121
Stat. at 1499 (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 32902(2)(A) (Supp. 1 2009)).
351. Press Release, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, President Obama
Announces National Fuel Efficiency Policy, May 19, 2009, available at http://whitehouse.
gov/the.press-office/President-Obama-Announces-National-Fuel-Efficiency-Policy.
352. Proposed Rulemaking To Establish Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission
Standards and Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards, 74 Fed. Reg. 49,454 (pro-
posed Sept. 28, 2009) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 86, 600 and 49 C.F.R. pts. 531, 533,
537, and 538). The new CAFE Standards will cover model years 2012-2016, require an
average fuel economy standard of 35.5 mpg in 2016, and include the first-ever national
emissions standards under the EPA's greenhouse gas program. Notice of Upcoming Joint
Rulemaking to Establish Vehicle GHG Emissions and CAFE Standards, 74 Fed. Reg.
24,007, 24,009 (proposed May 22, 2009); U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, OFFICE OF TRANS.
AND AIR QUALITY, EPA-420-F-09-047, EPA AND NHTSA PROPOSE HISTORIC NATIONAL
GREEN-HOUSE PROGRAM TO REDUCE GREENHOUSE GASES AND IMPROVE FUEL ECONOMY
FOR CARS AND TRUCKS (2009). This particular notice of proposed rulemaking came on the
heels of an earlier notice of proposed rulemaking on May 19, 2009, in which the Depart-
ment of Transportation and the EPA issued a notice of intent proposing a National Pro-
gram for Model Years 2012 and 2016 to coordinate greenhouse gas emissions and fuel
economy. Notice of Upcoming Joint Rulemaking to Establish Vehicle GHG Emissions and
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* Increased fuel taxes/carbon tax: While gas and diesel fuel tax
increases would be politically unpopular, they would reward help-
ful social behavior and signal efficient market behavior s53 Since
taxes are regressive, some of their impact on the poor could be re-
duced by tax credits or reduction of payroll taxes. Despite their
unpopularity,154 tax increases would help distribute the carbon
dioxide pollution, road damage, and other vehicle operation costs
society incurs beyond the initial purchase of vehicles s.3 , Such tax-
es are also the only effective price signal to discourage unneces-
sary driving and create market opportunities for other transpor-
tation systems, like trains and mass transit.5 6 Former Federal
Reserve Chairman, Paul Volcker, and former Council of Economic
Advisors Chairman, Martin Feldstein, have endorsed this general
approach as a viable method of reducing the federal budget deficit
and equalizing the tax treatment of other states . 57
e Permanent Feebate System: Similar to the recent Cash for
Clunkers program, RMI suggested a permanent system in which
purchasers of light vehicles would receive a government credit,
against the purchase price of the vehicle, if that vehicle's fuel
economy exceeded a "pivot point" for vehicles of a given size.3 58
Surcharges, similar to the U.S. "gas guzzler" tax,359 would be le-
vied upon vehicles that are above the pivot point.3 60 Interestingly,
RMI proposed that the pivot point be legally set at a current rate
where the surcharge revenue is equal to that of the "feebates" so
that the entire program can be revenue neutral.3 61 RMI suggested
feebates could be used as an alternative to CAFE standards.362
CAFE standards have to be constantly adjusted through a com-
plex and divisive political process.3 63 By contrast, feebates are ma-
CAFE Standards, 74 Fed. Reg. at 24,007 (proposed May 22, 2009).
353. See LOVINS ET AL., supra note 341, at 174 n.720.
354. But see id. at 266 (discussing how the subsequent income tax revenues from in-
come no longer spent on fuel will "entirely offset" the decline of gas tax receipts).
355. See id. at 174 (arguing "[tihe main virtue of higher gasoline taxes would be [to]
reduc[e] miles driven after the car is bought").
356. See id. (stating that fuel prices do not show all the costs of gasoline use to society,
but fuel taxes could reduce the number of miles people drive).
357. See id. at 174 n.719.
358. Id. at 186.
359. 26 U.S.C. § 4064 (2006).
360. LOVINS ET AL., supra note 341, at 186.
361. See id.
362. See id. at 186-87.
363. The recent proposed rule by EPA and DOT to increase CAFE standards was over
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thematically constant, based on a reward and penalty system
that will continuously propel innovation.3  For low-income indi-
viduals, the feebates systems could be augmented with a program
similar to Cash for Clunkers or a novel system in which the U.S.
Government would competitively procure highly efficient vehicles
for lease to low-income or qualifying small business taxpayers 65
e Aggressive Propulsion Research: RMI advocates aggressive
funding of alternative energy technologies in the military sector,
both to eliminate the combat effectiveness concerns discussed by
the CNA MAB and also to help spur commercialization of fuel cell
technologies that are already in use in submarines and space-
craft.366 RMI asserted that U.S. research and development com-
mitments in hydrogen fuel cell research are no greater than those
of other major developed countries, yet hydrogen is argued to be
the best possible hope for the United States to eliminate its de-
pendence on imported oil and carbon producing fuels, including
natural gas.3 67 It makes good sense to concentrate this basic and
applied research activity in the DOD because it needs fuel cells
for a full spectrum of uses: light vehicles, heavy vehicles, power
plants, aircraft, and other platforms. Also, direct financing of tra-
ditional DOD contractors in the applied research and fielding of
working fuel cell prototypes, is the fastest way to bring these
technologies to market quickly, as opposed to funding basic re-
search and national laboratories, which have spotty track records
of being able to successfully transition technology into the com-
mercial marketplace.3 61 Since the RMI report was written in 2005,
300 pages in length. See Proposed Rulemaking To Establish Light-Duty Vehicle Green-
house Gas Emission Standards and Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards, 74 Fed.
Reg. 49,454-49,789 (proposed Sept. 28, 2009) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 531, 533,
534, 537, and 538). One can easily envision a docket of many thousands of pages of com-
ments that will have to be analyzed by DOT and EPA officials and incorporated into a
commentary that will accompany the final rule. That process of review and documentation
is likely to take months and many years of effort.
364. LOVINS ET AL., supra note 341, at 187.
365. Id. at 193.
366. See id. at 230-32.
367. Id. at 232, 236, 242. Fuel cell powertrains have about one-tenth of the moving
parts of an engine-based power train and have considerable potential as both mobile and
stationary sources of energy generation (versus fuel-fired plants) and heavy lift applica-
tions. Id. at 232, 236; Jennifer Gangi, Fuel Cells Do Some Heavy Lifting, ALTERNATIVE
ENERGY EMAG., June 2007, http://www.altenergymag.com/emagazine.php?issuenumber=
07.06.01&article=forklifts.
368. NATL AcAD. OF SCI. ET AL., THE GOVERNMENT ROLE IN CIVILIAN TECHNOLOGY:
BUILDING A NEW ALLIANCE 18, 74-79 (1992).
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much has been done in the development of alternative fuels and
energy sources; however, it is still appropriate to revisit whether
programs are sufficient to advance these goals.
G. International Assistance and Development Programs
The Kyoto Protocol successor agreement is expected to contain
the same system as the original Protocol, in which Annex II coun-
tries are incentivized-through a carbon credit-to fund clean
energy development and carbon sequestration projects in the de-
veloping world . 69 The jury is out on whether this funding will be
sufficient and available on time to prevent the collapse of many
states. Accordingly, widening access to energy services for the
poor abroad must be a component of the overall security strategy.
The ability of the United States to successfully grapple with this
reality and to take effective action will ultimately determine
whether the U.S. government is an impact player on the interna-
tional development stage or the author of many glossy studies
that talk about the need for action but take none.
Currently, it seems clear that there is bipartisan consensus for
domestic programs to curtail domestic reliance on imported oil
and to move America to a new energy economy.3 70 It also seems
clear that the Kyoto/Copenhagen successor agreement will con-
tain some sort of carbon trading system. 71 The carbon sequestra-
tion aspect of a global trading system does incentivize developing
countries to plant trees and engage in sustainable agriculture,
but the question remains whether those macro policies will
trickle down quickly enough to have the impact necessary to
stave off the onset of climate change effects and the subsequent
collapse of the states that are currently at risk. It also is unclear
369. See Climate Deal Sealed by U.S. U-Turn, BBC NEWS, Dec. 15, 2007, http://news.
bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/7145608.stm (describing the 2007 "Bali roadmap" to a suc-
cessor Kyoto Protocol). Most recently, the Copenhagen Climate Change Conference was
expected to further the goal a final successor agreement to the Kyoto Protocol. See Copen-
hagen and Beyond: Is There a Successor to the Kyoto Protocol?, Hearing Before the H.
Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 111th Cong. 1-4, 51-52 (2009) (statements of Howard L. Ber-
man, Chairman, Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, Member, H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, and Steven
Groves, Bernard and Barbara Loman Fellow).
370. See SARAH LADISLAW ET AL., WORLD RES. INST., CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT'L
STUDIES, A ROADMAP FOR A SECURE, Low-CARBON ENERGY ECONOMY: BALANCING ENERGY
SECURITY AND CLIMATE CHANGE 7, 25 (2009), available at http://csis.org/files/media/csis/
pubs/090204_energy-roadmap.pdf.
371. Climate Deal Sealed by U.S. U-Turn, supra note 369.
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whether or not these macro policies will immediately translate in-
to clean electric power generation plants in the developing world.
The central governments in many developing countries are ei-
ther too weak or too disorganized to have central energy policies
that are effective.172 Additionally, public utilities in those coun-
tries are often very "inefficient and.., see no incentive or profit
to serve [the poor] ."373 Though controversial, the U.S. government,
working either independently or in concert with other countries 3 74
needs to mobilize the U.S. energy sector to become direct partici-
pants in energy generation activities of developing countries. The
U.S. government should provide a combination of loan guarantees
or heavily subsidized political risk insurance-against expropria-
tion-to diversified and properly capitalized energy companies,
including U.S. utility companies, in order to supply windmills,
electric grid supplies, and other low-carbon energy systems in the
developing world, in exchange for granting these companies long-
term concessions to operate these generation systems. Such a
program might also include giving the supplying company a li-
mited monopoly to provide or license the local manufacture of
lighting, stoves, and refrigeration units to the ultimate consum-
ers, in exchange for putting some capital at risk to enter these vo-
latile markets. Strong governmental involvement by U.S. embas-
sies abroad 75 to facilitate these transactions in the developing
world is essential.
372. See, e.g., PACIFIC ISLANDS RENEWABLE ENERGY PROJECT, PACIFIC REGIONAL
ENERGY ASSESSMENT 2004, at vi-vii, x, 37-38 (2004), http://www.sprep.org/att/publication/
000427_vanuatuPIREP final.pdf.
373. UN-ENERGY, supra note 160, at 9.
374. China immediately comes to mind given its extensive investment activity in Afri-
ca. See generally Ed Cropley & Ben Hirschler, Davos Special Report: Africa Rising,
REUTERS, Jan. 26, 2010, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE60P04120100126 (dis-
cussing Chinese investment in African infrastructure).
375. Critics may argue that this falls within the mission of Commercial Attachds at
U.S. embassies abroad to promote U.S. exports. See Int'l Trade Admin., Promoting Trade
and Investment, http://www.trade.gov/promotingtrade/index.asp (last visited Feb. 23,
2010). However, these small offices often lack the overall clout with host governments or
the resources to have the type of impact necessary to arrest imprudent use of carbon-based
fuels and prevent state collapse. Fortress America Abroad: Effective Diplomacy and the
Future of U.S. Embassies, Hearing Before the Subcommm. on National Security and For-
eign Affairs of the Comm. on Oversight and Government Reform, 110th Cong. 36-39 (2008)
(testimony of John K. Naland, President, American Foreign Service Association). To be
successful, this should be made a top priority of the ambassador to these countries with
their career success directly tied to the number of deals that they are able to close.
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Also, we must accept that in some developing countries, there
is little or no hope of any commercial success; therefore, programs
in such countries would have to be driven almost exclusively with
public financing from either donor countries, NGOs, or the suc-
cessor to the IPCC.376 As a commercial option, these programs
should be driven by the commercial imperative of creating new
markets for the U.S. energy industry and the policy goal of pro-
viding clean electrons to the developing world. It should not be
viewed as a competitor to or replacement for traditional assis-
tance programs or as the U.S. approach to the Clean Development
Mechanism under the Kyoto scheme.377
H. International Sanctions and Trade
The Kyoto agreement and its eventual successor will largely re-
ly on self-enforcement 7 What is absent from the Protocol, and is
not mentioned in the discussion of negotiating drafts in prepara-
tion for the Copenhagen Round, is a discussion of substantive
sanctions if a state does not make its commitments.37 9 Indeed, the
Copenhagen Accord relies, out of political necessity, entirely on
voluntary compliance activities by states.380 If all states do not vo-
luntarily comply with Kyoto, the entire system will likely col-
lapse. Therefore, in assessing the wisdom of the current ap-
376. UN-ENERGY, supra note 160, at 13.
377. Even though this proposal should not be predicated as a compliance technique un-
der the Kyoto Protocol's CDM, or its successor, it should not suggest that trading credits
could never be made available to companies as an inducement to enter into these transac-
tions. In order for the United States to comply with its basic obligations under Kyoto, it is
envisioned that a number of public utilities currently using coal as their primary fuel will
have to use the CDM as a crutch to stay in operation for the near term. If there are suffi-
cient opportunities in the CDM for the benefit of all industrial concerns in the United
States, then that course of action should certainly be pursued.
378. Countries that fail to meet their emissions targets by the end of the first commit-
ment period (2012) must make up the difference plus a penalty of 30% in the second com-
mitment period. Their ability to sell credits under emissions trading will also be sus-
pended. UNFCC, An Introduction to the Kyoto Protocol Compliance Mechanism, http://
unfccc.int/kyoto-protocol/compliance/introduction/items/3024.php (last visited Feb. 23,
2010).
379. See Edward Wong & Jonathan Ansfield, China Insists that Its Steps on Climate Be
Voluntary, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2010, at A5 (suggesting that the voluntary nature of emis-
sions targets is crucial to ensuring the involvement of developing countries in global ef-
forts to fight climate change).
380. See generally Morten Andersen, A Copenhagen Accord It Is, Government of Den-
mark, Dec. 19, 2009, http://www.denmark.dk/en/menu/Climate-Energy/COP15-Copenha
gen-2009/Selected-COP15-news/A+Copenhagen-Accord-it-is.htm.
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proach, it is useful to review the reasons for the relative success 381
of the Montreal Protocol 3 2 in containing the emission of sub-
stances that deplete the Ozone Layer. 83 Article 8 of the Montreal
Protocol empowered the Treaty's Implementation Committee to
establish enforcement and compliance modalities.84 By 1992, an
Implementation Committee was formed with the powers to re-
ceive and investigate complaints and approve and monitor draft
action plans of offending countries.38 5 Other sanctions "'might be
taken by a meeting of the parties in respect of non-compliance
with the Protocol' includes issuing formal cautions and the sus-
pension of specific rights and privileges under the protocol, such
as those dealing with finance and trade .... -"386 Even though no
trade sanctions have ever been ordered by the parties to the Mon-
treal Protocol, the regime allows for restrictions on trade in prod-
ucts controlled by the agreement, such as bans for those products
that have been produced using any prohibited gases. These pro-
visions are essential to prevent industry from moving from one
country to another in order to escape the phase-out schedules of
the treaty.388 These provisions are also necessary to prevent coun-
tries from backsliding on their obligations to gain industry ad-
vantages.
381. The [Montreal Protocol] has proved to be a highly effective agreement....
[b]y September 2003, a total of 184 countries had ratified it. No producers or
significant consumers are left outside. Even though it allows developing na-
tions, unlike industrialized states, a grace period in which to implement con-
trols, world production of [chlorofluorocarbons] fell by 86 percent between 1986
and 1999... [such that] full recovery is expected by the middle of the century.
Duncan Brack, Monitoring the Montreal Protocol, in VERIFICATION YEARBOOK 2003, at
209, 212 (Trevor Findlay ed., 2003).
382. Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987,
104 Stat. 2399, 1522 U.N.T.S. 3.
383. Brack, supra note 381, at 209; see also U.N. ENV'T. PROGRAMME IMPLEMENTATION
COMM., DECISIONS OF THE PARTIES RELATED TO THE NON-COMPLIANCE PROCEDURE OF THE
MONTREAL PROTOCOL ON SUBSTANCES THAT DEPLETE THE OZONE LAYER 31-115 (Oct.
2007), available at http://ozone.unep.org/Meeting-Documents/impcom/MOPdecisionson_
NCP.pdf.
384. Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer art. 8, supra note
382, 104 Stat. at 2668, 1522 U.N.T.S. at 35.
385. Brack, supra note 381, at 216-18.
386. Id. at 218. States that are non-compliant would lose access to the Treaty's Multila-
teral Fund, which is designed to provide financial and technical assistance to states in or-
der to enhance their compliance activities. Id. at 223.
387. Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer art. 4, supra note
382, 104 Stat. at 2668, 1522 U.N.T.S. at 33-34; see also Brack, supra note 381, at 220.
388. Brack, supra note 381, at 200.
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VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Some controversy remains over the extent or pace of climate
change. However, there seems to be universal agreement from
individuals from all political spectrums that reducing U.S. de-
pendence on foreign oil is a national security imperative. 8 9 Even
President George W. Bush endorsed the principle in his 2006
State of the Union Address stating that the United States needed
to wean its addiction to foreign oil and "increase our research in
better batteries for hybrid and electric cars and in pollution-free
cars that run on hydrogen."390 There also seems to be an emerging
national consensus that reducing GHG emissions is something
that needs to happen domestically and internationally in a
prompt and balanced fashion.
In assessing the macro policies outlined above and the various
steps being taken, all measures being undertaken both domesti-
cally and internationally comport with their stated policies and,
over time, will help reduce U.S. vulnerabilities. The current and
planned tax preferences for private industry investment in alter-
native energy-including the utility companies-are essential to
stimulating the research and development associated with field-
ing these new technologies. Investment in such technologies is
important to reduce many of the risk factors to the United States
as outlined by Jared Diamond,3 91 especially climate change, since
the United States is such a large per capita producer of GHG,3 92
and U.S. actions will be copied by other states. In that regard, the
United States needs to reconsider its tax policies on research and
experimentation. These credits should be made permanent and
should be on par with those of other developed countries to en-
sure, at the very least, that the research and development dollars
do not migrate from the United States to other jurisdictions that
grant a more generous preference.393 Investment tax credits for
389. See John Kerry & Lindsey Graham, Yes We Can (Pass Climate Change Legisla-
tion), N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2009, at WK11 (discussing the alignment of Republicans and
Democrats on finding clean, independent energy sources that will protect American jobs
and safeguard national security).
390. Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union, 42
WEEKLY COMP. 150 (Jan. 31, 2006).
391. See DIAMOND, supra note 11, at 486.
392. Seth Borenstein, Pollution Up Despite Economic Downturn, SEATLE TIMES, Nov.
18, 2009, at A3.
393. Peter Morici, Recalibrating U.S.-China, New America Foundation, Policy Paper,
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conversion to alternative energy sources should be given time to
work, but consideration should be given to making those tax cre-
dits permanent and inclusive of such things as conversion from
coal and oil to natural gas.
United States government funding for basic and applied re-
search in alternative energy by DOE should be increased. Al-
though the most recent list of research programs by DOE's Ad-
vanced Research Program3 94 is impressive, it needs to be
continued and expanded. DOD also should continue to program
for and develop next generation systems using alternative energy
sources, such as hydrogen fuel cells, which could be transitioned
into the commercial marketplace. There are many good programs
in DOD; there needs to be more.395 This heavy investment in re-
search, development, and technology needs to continue at a high
rate because the United States risks being commercially margi-
nalized out of this important emerging market if it does not ag-
gressively invest now. China, for example, is now investing ten
times as much in clean power-as a percentage of GDP-as the
United States.396
The revolutionary proposals put forth by RMI to increase fuel
taxes and dampen demand for petroleum need to be given close
scrutiny. United States consumers currently pay an 18.4 cents
per gallon federal tax397 on finished gasoline, which is far below
the true costs associated with the use of that product.39 The fed-
(June 11, 2009), http://www.newamerica.net/publications/policy/recalibratingJ US_China.
394. See supra note 285 and accompanying text concerning ARPA-E.
395. In September, DOD awarded an $11 million contract to Solazyme of San Francis-
co, California, and Sustainable Fuels of Bozeman, Montana, to produce jet fuel from algae
and camalina. Executive Summary, FED. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2009, at 2. The Marine Corps
recently awarded a contract to General Electric to build and manage a "smart grid" system
for the Twentynine Palms Marine Corps Air Station in California, the Marine Corps' larg-
est base. William Matthews, Marine Base Sees Savings in 'Smart Microgrid,' FED. TIMES,
Aug. 10, 2009, at 16. The Marine Corps Air Station in Camp Pendleton, California has re-
newable energy projects including the installation of photovoltaic and solar panels. Press
Release, Lee H. Saunders, Naval Facilities Eng'g Command, Recovery Act Funds Camp
Pendleton Air Station Solar and Lighting Upgrades (Sept. 10, 2009), available at https:
//portal.navfac.navy.milportal/pls/portal/APPPAO.PRESSRELEASEFULLDYN.Show
?p.arg-names=newsid&p.arg-.values=3412.
396. See John Doerr & Jeff Immelt, Falling Behind on Green Tech, WASH. POST, Aug. 3,
2009, at A17.
397. 26 U.S.C. § 4081(a)(2)(A)-(B) (2006). States also levy taxes on fuel. State taxes
range from 32.4 cents in Alaska to 69.7 cents in California. See AM. PETROLEUM INST.
MOTOR FUEL TAXES: OCTOBER SUMMARY REPORT (2009), http://www.api.org/statisticsfuel
taxes/.
398. Robert Puentes & Adie Tomer, Untangling Transportation Funding, BROOKINGS
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eral tax is also well below the per gallon tax in other industria-
lized countries, including Germany ($6.28), the UK ($3.49), Japan
(about $5.20), 399 and Korea ($3.21).40o We should not repeat the
expensive mistakes of the past with regard to the U.S. auto in-
dustry by not holding them to high energy efficiency standards.
The United States should follow through to establish aggressive
CAFE standards. Using the interesting feebates proposal also
would help to contain SUV excesses and send the correct technol-
ogy development signals.401 In both cases, higher taxes on gasoline
and stricter standards will dampen dependence on imported oil
and would help mitigate the "hostile neighbors" risk factor men-
tioned above.
The successor of the Kyoto agreement and domestic cap-and-
trade legislation must be pursued quickly to address a variety of
risks. It is hoped, however, that U.S. negotiators learn the lessons
of the Montreal Protocol and incorporate provisions that enable
some treaty entity-like the CDM secretariat-to have the power
to levy some sort of sanctions against states that fail to domesti-
cally enforce their GHG mandates. For example, trade that is
linked to non-complaint GHG emissions could be banned from in-
ternational trade and commerce.40 2 Those sorts of provisions are
essential to preserve the overall integrity of the treaty and to
build consensus in the United States for shared sacrifices, which
will be felt as domestic cap-and-trade levels begin to take hold
and result in increased electrical power costs-in the near term,
at least. This approach is also essential to dampen calls for mod-
INST., Feb. 26, 2009, http://www.brookings.eduopinions/2009/0226_vehicle-miles-traveled
_puentes.aspx?p=l.
399. Rising Sum: Japan's Gas-Tax Debate Challenges Government, WALL ST. J., May
13, 2008, available at http://blogs.wsj.com/environmentalcapital/2008/05/13/rising-sum-ja
pans-gas-tax-debate-challenges-government. United States tax rates are comparable to
those in China (14.8 cents) and Singapore (43 cents). See Fu Jing, Fuel Tax Reform an
Energy Milestone, CHINA DAILY, Dec. 29, 2008, available at http://www.chinadaily.com.
cnlbizchina/2008-12/29/content 7349014.htm; Nat'l Ctr. for Envtl. Econ., Singapore Road
and Vehicle Taxation (Jan. 28, 2010), http://yosemite.epa.gov/ee/epalib/incent.nsf/Geogra
phic%20Area!OpenView&Start=88 (follow "Singapore" hyperlink; then follow "11.1.5.5.
Singapore Road and Vehicle Taxation" hyperlink).
400. Sonya Hoo & Robert Ebel, An International Perspective on Gasoline Taxes, TAX
NOTES, Sept. 26, 2005, available at http://www.urban.org/publications/1000845.html.
401. See supra notes 361-65 and accompanying text.
402. Another model for consideration would be the methods by which trade of the
products derived from endangered species is banned. See Convention on International
Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, Mar. 3, 1973, 27.2 U.S.T. 1087,
993 U.N.T.S. 243.
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ification of the world trading system so that producers in states
that do not comply with GHG emission levels are punitively
taxed. 0 3 Any such proposal to link a Copenhagen "agreement" to
the World Trade Organization ("WTO") agreements would be
enormously controversial and sure to produce gridlock at the
WTO.414 Such well-intentioned proposals could also lead to serious
trade wars in which there are never any winners.
Most Americans support a transition to clean energies like
wind, solar, geothermal, and renewable fuels.4 15 What is not clear
is whether advanced technologies will be able to satisfy U.S. and
global demand for electricity and power transportation systems in
the foreseeable future. Transition from coal and oil will not occur
overnight, and U.S. policymakers will need to assess whether
nuclear energy and natural gas are appropriate transitional
forms of energy. Nuclear energy emits no greenhouse gases and is
not dependent upon foreign fuel sources. 40 6 Yet, it remains politi-
cally charged because of lingering concerns with safety, and legal
403. The skirting of these GHG obligations translates into the avoidance of costs by
exporters. Such avoidance would seem to have the same practical effect as a subsidy that
would entitle the receiving country to levy something akin to a countervailing duty for the
costs of compliance. The WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures does
not currently recognize this type of cost avoidance as a subsidy. See Agreement on Subsi-
dies and Countervailing Measures, 1994 O.J. (L 336) 156. Although, some scholars feel
that a "border tax adjustment" is appropriate and lawful under the WTO regime to "make
adjustments for the fact that industries in the relevant sector in non-participating States
do not bear the burden of GHG mitigation costs that are borne by participating States."
See Eliza Malathouni & Denise Provost, An International Trade Law Perspective on
Sectpral Greenhouse Gas Emission Mitigation Approaches 25 (June 12, 2009), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=1417343; see also Jake Colvin, Ameri-
ca's Green Trade Challenge, BUSINESSWEEK ONLINE, Aug. 11, 2009, available at http:ll
businessweek.com/print/bwdaily/dnflash/content/aug2009/db2009811 875168.htm (expres-
sing fear that the new "green trade" movement will be used as a new protectionist meas-
ure to exclude foreign products from the U.S. market and start a trade war). Colvin cited
examples of such measures, including Brazil recently raising its tariff on wind turbines
from 0% to 14%, as well as China sheltering its market for its "local green contracts even
as it exports much of its clean energy manufacturers, like solar energy panels, to the U.S."
Id.
404. In 2001, the WTO started negotiating a new agreement on agricultural subsidies.
See John Miller & Greg Hitt, World News: Tariff Disputes Make Breakthrough Unlikely in
Doha Trade Talks, WALL ST. J., July 18, 2008, at A5. As of the most recent Doha round of
trade negotiations, an agreement has still not been reached. See Mary Kissel, Bureaucrats
at the Barricades, WALL ST. J., Oct. 5, 2009, at A17.
405. See Steven Mufson & Jennifer Agiesta, On Energy, Obama Finds Broad Support,
WASH. POST, Aug. 28, 2009, at A21.
406. U.S. DEP'T. OF ENERGY, THE GLOBAL NUCLEAR ENERGY PARTNERSHIP: GREATER
ENERGY SECURITY IN A CLEANER, SAFER WORLD (2006), http://www.energy.gov/media/GN
EP/06-GA50035b.pdf.
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issues, which have blocked planned waste disposal projects, and
the high costs of plant construction.4°7 Nonetheless, this is an
energy source in which the United States has developed excellent
technology,4 8 and it deserves a fair hearing.
Natural gas, on the other hand, is relatively abundant in the
United States and has been called a "Bridge to a Lower Green-
house Gas" future by both environmental groups and utilities419
because natural gas is the cleanest of the fossil fuels and now
provides U.S. utility companies with a hedge to comply with both
cap-and-trade programs of the twenty-three states that regulate
greenhouse gas emissions 410 and projected new federal stan-
dards.4 1' Natural gas is also very plentiful, given recent advance-
ments in extractions adjacent to plentiful shale deposits in the
U.S. 41 2 and is comparatively low cost. Natural gas is not a panacea
because of fugitive methane emissions-twenty-one times greater
global-warming potential than carbon dioxide413-and the emis-
sion of carbon dioxide incident to the refining process. But with
407. RMI believes that nuclear power is not a long-term solution because of affordabili-
ty concerns. New nuclear plants are "simply unfinanceable in the private capital markets."
LOVINS ET AL., supra note 341, at 258. Despite that fact, the NRC has received seventeen
license applications for twenty-six new nuclear plants. These are the first applications for
new reactors since the 1970s. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., STATUS OF POTENTIAL NEW COM-
MERCIAL NUCLEAR REACTORS IN THE UNITED STATES (2009), http://www.eia.gov/cneaf/nuc
lear/page/nuc-reactors/comreactors.pdf.
408. See LARRY PARKER & MARK HOLT, NUCLEAR POWER: OUTLOOK FOR NEW U.S.
REACTORS 3-4 (2007).
409. See Eileen Clausen, President, Pew Ctr. on Global Climate Change, Speech at the
American Gas Association Executive Conference (Oct. 6, 2008), available at www.pewcli
mate.org/speeches/climate-policy-and-natural-gas ("[Pew Center] Members come from a
range of sectors, including oil .... electric and gas utilities .... and, of course, natural
gas.").
410. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., MARKET-BASED GREENHOUSE GAS CONTROL: SELECTED
PROPOSALS IN THE 111TH CONG. 1-4 (2009).
411. Id.
412. See, e.g., Robert Francis, Chesapeake Makes Major Natural Gas Discovery, Adds to
Barnett Shale Rigs, FORTH WORTH BUS. PRESS, May 26, 2008, available at http://www.fw
businesspress.com/display.php?id=7235 (describing major discoveries of natural gas in
Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Texas); Geology.com, Marcellus Shale-Appalachian Basin Nat-
ural Gas Play, http://geology.com/articles/marcellus-shale.shtml (last visited Feb. 23,
2010). To extract the natural gas from shale deposits, geologists employ a "fracturing me-
thod" to release natural gas trapped in the shale structure. Estimates vary, yet according
to Geology.com, the volume of gas from the Marcellus Shale deposit is sufficient to supply
the entire United States for two years. However, horizontal drilling in this one vast field
would double or triple those reserves. See id.
413. JOEL BLUESTEIN, PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, COVERAGE OF NATURAL
GA EMISSIONS AND FLOWS UNDER A GREENHOUSE GAS CAP-AND-TRADE PROGRAM 4 (2008)
(citing UNFCCC, Global Warming Potentials, http://www.unfccc.int/ghg-data/items/3825.
php (last visited Feb. 23, 2010)).
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stricter standards to minimize fugitive GHG emissions, natural
gas has excellent promise as a "bridge fuel to a more climate-
friendly energy supply. '1414 More extensive use of compressed nat-
ural gas ("CNG") in U.S. transportation systems appears to be the
best way to not only greatly reduce or eliminate the need to im-
port foreign oil, but also mitigate a major economic and political
risk factor for the United States.415 Given the evidence surround-
ing the availability of these two domestic sources of energy, are
policymakers doing enough to create the same body of incentives
in the form of tax credits or loan guarantees for investments in
nuclear and natural gas energy? Also, are there sufficient incen-
tives for the developers of these technologies to spend money on
research and experimentation, or to attract venture investment
capital on projects like construction of CNG infrastructure along
major highways, or on conversion of vehicles from gasoline or di-
esel fuel to CNG?
Electrification of the underdeveloped and developing world is
the one item that the current panoply of programs, laws, and pol-
icies does not squarely address. The notion of forging a new part-
nership between the U.S. government and industry to deliver al-
ternative energy systems to the underdeveloped and developing
world is highly costly and controversial, but it is arguably the
single most important policy that the United States and other de-
veloped countries must pursue to reduce the rate of state failure
and additional negative externalities. Such a unilateral approach
is inspired by Friedman, who holds the view that a market-based
approach, involving private investment capital, is the only effec-
tive way to move high technology into grossly underserved mar-
kets .416
414. Claussen, supra note 409.
415. Some energy advocates, such as T. Boone Pickens, suggest that natural gas and
wind power generation are the best approach to eliminate dependence on imported oil,
with compressed natural gas being the only viable alternative to diesel fuel and gasoline to
power cars and trucks. Pickens appears to have been successful in building substantial
support for many aspects of his plan; especially dealing with expanded use of domestic
natural gas. See T. Boone Dickens & Orin Hatch, Op-Ed, Natural Gas Vehicles Would Cut
Oil Imports, SALT LAKE TRIB., Oct. 14, 2009. Others have also questioned whether domes-
tic supplies are in fact bountiful enough to displace imported oil, and whether the United
States can easily sustain the costs of conversion to compressed natural gas. See Thomas K
Grose, Can Natural Gas Break Our Oil Habit?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Online Edition,
Mar. 5, 2009, available at http://www.usnews.com/articles/news/energy/2009/03/05/can-nat
ural-gas-break-our-oil-habit.html.
416. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 11, at 171, 176, 187.
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"[Tihere is no ark without a Noah. In every instance you need a
Noah who is able to pull together this coalition, this ecosystem, by
helping everyone see his or her self-interest in its preservation."417
As things now stand, government and NGO donor programs lack
the technical expertise or size necessary to implement this plan
on a global scale. The merit of the approach outlined above is
that, if the United States is successful on a limited scale, it could
stimulate competition with other developed countries and induce
their industries to enter this emerging market. There should be
no illusions that this direct investment scheme does not entail
some risk of loss for companies, the U.S. government-at the ma-
cro level-and for U.S. Ambassadors. However, this is a risk that
is worth taking because it presents an enormous economic oppor-
tunity for the United States. The United States should address
the whole host of problems discussed in this paper and reclaim its
rightful position of leadership.
417. Id. at 303.
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